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 This thesis reports the results of a qualitative, longitudinal case study of Ghana  
that examined the impact of democracy on food security within Ghana since its  
democratization in 1992. First, the study reviews existing literature about food security, a 
newly-emerging concern in political science, as well as the literature on democracy  
and human rights. To fill the gaps in existing literature regarding the impact of 
democracy on food security, [and the author finds it overzealous to prove that  
democracy always benefits food security levels across varying states, cultures, and years]  
the thesis examines food security developments in Ghana, a developing democracy in 
southern Africa.  
 The study analyzes the shift in the food security status that Ghana experienced 
from pre-democratization (pre-1992) to post-democratization (post-1992) in order to 
determine whether and how democracy had a positive impact. The author studies 
legislation, policy implementations, literature, and data of pre- and post-democratization 
years. Based on these data, it appears that in the specific case of Ghana, democracy has 
positively impacted food security levels because of democracy’s two main mechanisms: 
political stability and government effectiveness, and government accountability and 
 
 
proficiency. Since 1992, Ghana has made great strides in both democratic mechanisms 
and has, in turn, transformed itself from being a state that primarily focuses on improving 
the economy at the expense of the majority and for the benefit of the political and social 
elite, to a nation that prioritizes a free and nonviolent environment, having a moral and 
citizen-centered government grounded in equality, and the political participation of 
individuals and citizen organizations that work together to improve general wellbeing and 
food security. For Ghana, it appears that democratizing and remaining committed to 
democracy fostered great strides toward food security. The potential for applying these 
findings to other studies emerges out of the study’s larger implications. Ultimately, these 
mechanisms can be tested in other cases to see if similar findings emerge. This then can 
contribute to theory development with regards to the relationship between democracy and 
food security.  
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PART ONE: FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS - DEMOCRACY AND FOOD  
SECURITY 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
One of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no 
substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic 
form of government and relatively free press…famines never afflicted 
any country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that 
has opposition parties to voice criticisms, that permits newspapers to 
report freely and to question the wisdom of government policies 
without extensive censorship – Amartya Sen, The Washington Times, 
Oct 20 1998; p. A12. 
 
 Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the dissolution of Communist 
Soviet Union, democracy emerged within many states as an icon of legitimacy, 
representative government, freedom, such that: “By the mid-1990s, the percentage of 
states in the world that were democracies had increased from 27 percent in 1974 to over 
60 percent. Democracy had become the dominant form of government in the world” 
(Diamond 2005, 13). Scholars such as Amartya Sen—renowned economist, philosopher, 
and Nobel Memorial Prize winner—studied this trend, as well as what many states  
deemed to be the benefits of democracy in the everyday lives of citizens. Sen introduced  
his pioneering argument in the early 1970s (stated in the quotation above) that remains a 
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controversial debate in the discipline of political science: That is, that democracy’s 
principle of “government by and for the people,” when properly and fully adhered to, 
prevents famine in all democracies. Furthermore, the emerging interest in food justice 
and food sovereignty studies in the field of political science has added dimension to this 
debate by raising the question of if and how democracy positively impacts human rights 
and, more specifically, food security. The complexity of this issue has left the field of 
political science with little substantial progress or new findings since Sen’s work in the 
late twentieth century. Yet, many democracy and food security scholars still deem Sen’s 
findings relevant to this study (see Beetham 1997;1999; Langlois 2003; Nezhad et al. 
2011; Spicker 2008). However, his work has a number of critics who suggest that his 
work is more romanticized than realistic, that it has inescapable gaps, and that it may no 
longer have a sound place in the debate about democracy’s impact on famine. (see de 
Waal 1990; Edkins 2001; Keen 1994). 
 Sen’s work, while deemed revolutionary within twentieth century political 
scholarship, has left the twenty-first century discipline with unanswered questions and 
unresolved debate. For example, does the proclaimed power of democracy apply to lesser 
forms of food insecurity than famine? Can food security exist in non-democracies or is 
democracy always obligatory? Undoubtedly, Sen has provided democracy advocates and 
scholars with a strong initial stepping stone for the study of the potential positive effects 
of democracy within given states, but such a bold argument that democracy never allows 
for or tolerates famine is a finding that needs to be retested to prove its continuous 
applicability in the modern world. Some scholars (such as those discussed in the review 
of literature, Part I, Chapter 2) have tackled the objective of qualitatively and empirically 
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proving that Sen’s findings still apply to all states, and to the more general issue of food 
security, not simply famine. These studies have largely been conducted by gathering data 
from hundreds of countries across the globe and, while their findings do support Sen’s 
original argument that democracy is a powerful famine (and more generally, food 
insecurity) prevention tool, this is largely the extent of their findings and their 
contributions to existing scholarship. Finding it overzealous to prove that democracy 
always benefits food security levels across varying states, cultures, years, etc., this study 
serves to determine whether or not democracy’s mechanisms are conducive to food 
security in the specific case of Ghana, a developing democracy in southern Africa.  
 
Statement of Purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to conduct a longitudinal case study of Ghana with 
the intention of evaluating Ghana’s developing democracy in relation to its strengthening 
food security system. The intent is to determine whether and how food security 
improvements in Ghana are a product of democratic politics. While many factors, such as 
a state’s economic stance or receipt of food aid, can contribute to food security 
improvements within any given state, Ghana’s democratization and food security 
improvements pose a unique possibility that food security may have risen primarily as a 
result of the state’s growing democracy. While this is a possibility, it is an unfounded 
presumption and therefore poses a unique research opportunity. Accordingly, this thesis 
serves to determine if these two variables—democracy and food security—are 
independent of each other but have occurred in harmony, or if democracy has directly 
caused Ghana’s incremental food security advances.     
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Significance 
 The specific nature of this thesis exceeds the parameters of previous scholarship 
because it allows for a more detailed and analytical examination of the relationship 
between democracy and food security within an individual state. The more commonly 
used research design involves conducting a cross-national study. Cross-national studies 
and analyses tend to provide the finding that democracy has aided in food security 
improvements across a multitude of countries, but rarely, if ever, provide answers to the 
most significant questions of why and how democracy has successfully done so within all 
of these cases. As a result, the findings of these studies are helpful in providing brief 
analyses of what is currently occurring in varying democratic states; however, they fail to 
focus on what these cases have in common, and, most importantly, what democratic 
mechanisms are common to all the cases. Arguably, they fail to show the “bigger 
picture,” or what their findings mean. This leaves the discipline with very little progress 
in understanding how to apply existing theory about the benefits of democracy to the real 
world. The following analysis serves to fill this research gap by collecting specific 
findings of one successful case—Ghana—and by studying the many ways in which 
Ghana has proven to be successful in reducing food insecurity since fully democratizing 
in 1992. Focusing on one case allows for a more detailed analysis of how—via what 
mechanisms—democracy may foster food security.  
 Ghana was chosen for this case study because its recent food security levels and  
democratic prospects have been distinguished in the international community and in  
scholarly works as exemplary. Furthermore, recent publications, news sources, and even 
the President of the United States, Barack Obama, have referred to Ghana as one of the 
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most accomplished countries in Africa in terms of maintaining a true democracy and 
growing food security prospects (“Obama: Ghana’s Economy and Democracy is a 
Success Story”). Specifically, “Ghana reduced undernourishment more rapidly than any 
other country in the world between 1980 and 1996” (“Food Insecurity” 1999) and is often 
predicted to be the first country that will meet the Millennium Development Goal of 
cutting the country’s hunger in half by 2015 (IFPRI 2011). It further serves as an 
adequate, modern case study because it demonstrates how a state can transform from an 
authoritarian regime with significant levels of food stress into a well-functioning 
democracy with greatly increased food security levels. While existing data and literature 
suggest that such progress is a success story, they do not give insight into why and how 
Ghana has accomplished these improvements, what implications emerge, and how such 
implications can provide important advancements in theory-building within political 
science.  
 Conducting this study has three potential benefits: First, and most importantly,  
to provide insight into why and how Ghana has continued to reduce food insecurity  
through recent decades, thus affording Ghanaian scholars and officials a more  
comprehensive assessment of what democratic mechanisms, implementations and  
practices have been successful and how further improvements to these mechanisms may  
advance the state’s food security levels in the future; second, to provide an initial glimpse  
into how other African countries may follow the same or a similar path in order to reduce  
food insecurity within their states; and, third, to provide scholars a better understanding  
of why Ghana is often deemed a democracy and food security success case, and why  
Ghana serves as a stepping stone for further food security theory-building within the  
discipline. As Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz suggest, conducting such a longitudinal  
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case study may provide the discipline with more thorough and much needed  
understanding regarding the instances in which democracy may be a successful means of  
achieving higher food security levels (2004).  
 Undoubtedly, democracy may not always foster an environment conducive to  
upholding human rights and food security, as evidenced in the human rights struggles of  
India. As Anupam Hazra explains, between 1990 and 1992, 26 percent of India’s  
population was undernourished. Between 2003 and 2005, this increased to 28 percent  
(2009). According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), India’s  
Global Hunger Index (GHI) score has not seen any improvement in nearly 20 years. Even  
though India democratized in 1950, as of 2012, its GHI score lingers at 22.9, which is an  
“alarming” hunger level (International Food Policy Research Institute 2012).  
 
 
 
Study Overview 
 
 To accomplish its objective, this thesis contains three parts, consisting of a  
total of six chapters. Part one—entitled “Foundational Concepts – Democracy and Food 
Security”—begins with this introductory chapter followed by a literature review and 
statement of the research question and hypothesis in chapter two. It concludes with an 
explanation of the study’s research design in chapter three. Part two—“Ghana – Case 
Study, Findings, and Analysis”—presents the longitudinal case study of Ghana’s 
democratization and food security developments over time. Chapter four offers a brief 
discussion of the nation’s transformation since achieving independence, covering the 
many forms of government that Ghana has had throughout its history, leading up to and 
including its final democratization in 1992. Chapter four then eases into an analysis of 
how and why Ghana’s previous authoritarian years led to high levels of food insecurity. 
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Chapter five presents the case study’s main findings and analysis of how democratization 
and the mechanisms of democracy discussed within existing theoretical literature have—
when put into practice—have helped make food security advancements a reality for 
Ghana. Part three (chapter six) concludes this study with a summary of the research 
problem, methods and findings, conclusions and implications, and recommendations for 
future research.   
 
Conclusion 
 Briefly, this case study concludes first and foremost that, in the specific case of 
Ghana, democratic mechanisms have significantly and positively impacted food security 
levels by producing an environment in which food security efforts by the government and 
grassroots activity can develop and prosper. Because Ghana has made copious strides in 
both political stability and government effectiveness, and political participation and 
government accountability and proficiency, it has transformed itself from being a state 
that primarily focuses on improving the economy at the expense of the majority, and for 
the benefit of the political and social elite, to a nation that prioritizes the following: the 
political rights and freedoms of citizens; having a moral and citizen-centered government 
that equally and fairly distributes social services; governance via the collaboration of 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to improve the food 
and agriculture sector; and, as a result of all of these, the right to food and achieving food 
security. The findings of this study suggest that, for Ghana, democratizing and remaining 
committed to democratic mechanisms fostered food security. While this study does not 
claim that all democracies are food secure, or that democratizing always facilitates or 
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accelerates food security improvements, it does show that this was the case for Ghana. It 
suggests that more research is needed to determine if similar cases arrive at the same 
conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 The study of democracy’s effect on food security is heavily influenced by both  
old and new concepts. Specifically, this work examines the well-researched area of  
human rights as well as the particular issue of food security, a newly-emerging  
concern in political science. The most relevant theories and terms are defined below.  
Each of these theories and terms can have multiple definitions because of variation in  
sources, scholars, and years within which the terms have appeared in literature; however,  
the sections below provide contemporary, universal, and accepted definitions according  
to the most well-respected scholarly works pertaining to democracy, human rights, and  
food security. Following the discussion of relevant theories and terms, the section entitled  
“Review of the Theoretical Literature” examines existing literature pertaining to the  
connection among democracy, human rights, and food security collectively, and explains  
how the primary mechanisms of democracy impact food security. The chapter concludes  
with a presentation of the research question and hypothesis.  
 
 
Theories and Terms 
 
Democracy 
 
 This study recognizes that the definition of democracy is neither static nor  
inflexible. Defining democracy is complex because, as scholar Robert Dahl discusses in  
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Democracy and its Critics, political scientists do not collectively subscribe to one  
specific definition of democracy (1989). However, in order to study the democratic  
progression of Ghana and democracy’s potentially positive influence on food security  
levels, a general definition is necessary. A distinction must be made between when  
Ghana first declared itself a democracy (1957 to 1980s) and when Ghana proved to be a  
working democracy (1992 to present). Therefore, to differentiate between the two and to  
explain democracy and describe democratic regimes, this study provides an overview of  
the most universally studied components of democracy: its political and governmental  
components. As discussed below, these components generate a citizen-centered society in  
which food security can flourish. For this reason, a variety of sources and definitions  
have been analyzed to provide an inclusive understanding of these components of  
democracy and, therefore, democracy overall.  
 Regarding the “political structure” of democracy, scholar David Beetham— 
renowned for his works on democracy and its impact on human rights—argues that the  
political structure of democracy is grounded in the rights of citizens and principles of  
popular control and popular equality. 
Democracy I take to be a mode of decision-making about collectively 
binding rules and  policies over which the people exercise control, and 
the most democratic arrangement to be that in which all members of the 
collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-
making directly – one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest 
conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its 
exercise. (Beetham 1999, 33) 
In transcripts from his 2004 lecture entitled “What is Democracy?” Larry Diamond 
expands upon this description of democracy and explains that popular control is upheld in  
democracy because the citizens are self-governing and are perpetually the most powerful 
political actors in society because they have the authority to elect temporary leaders.  
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Furthermore, democracy only exists if popular control is dispersed equally to all citizens.  
Put into practice, we see the political structure of democracy as competition via free and 
fair elections among politically equal citizens. Political participation is therefore 
exemplified by “public participation, observance, deliberation, and political 
equality...freedom of speech, association and opinion” (Nezhad et al. 2011).  
 The “governmental structure” of democracy is rooted in the separation of powers 
and the rule of law.  In democracies, no branch of power can transcend the others because 
the principle of checks and balances prevents this from happening. The equality of all 
branches of government within democracy directly prevents the rise of authoritarian 
leadership. Furthermore, the rule of law ensures that citizens can only be “ruled by laws, 
not by individuals” (Diamond 2004). Thus, the people are represented and protected by 
these laws so as to prevent political suppression by overly powerful individuals. 
According to Democracy Web, an online resource created by Freedom House and the 
Albert Shanker Institute and funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, any 
breach of the constitution and of the people’s right to govern is an obstruction of 
democracy and calls for the dismissal of the individual(s) who violated citizens’ 
constitutional rights (2012). 
 Although the conceptual understanding of democracy described above provides 
insight into what many scholars consider to be the most significant components of 
democracy and, in turn, provides an understanding of what democracy is, the following 
study also requires a measurable understanding of democracy. To assess how Ghana’s 
levels of democracy have changed over time, some form of measurement is necessary. 
Arguably, the best way to measure Ghana’s democratic progression is to analyze where it  
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sits on a democratic scale and how Ghana’s position on that scale changes each year. To  
that end, this research used Freedom House scores.  
 Considered to be one of the world’s most renowned non-governmental political  
 
research institutes focusing on democracy, Freedom House is recognized for its  
 
democracy advocacy, significant research accomplishments, and overall integrity. Jessica  
 
Tuchman Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stated:  
 
“The explosion of democracy is a central development of our era. Freedom House  
 
provides an invaluable resource in this authoritative survey of the on-the-ground realities  
 
of the state of freedom around the world” (Freedom House 2013, 37). In an effort to  
 
expand recognition of the significance of democracy, and to analyze its presence in the  
 
global community over time, Freedom House has analyzed and evaluated countries  
 
according to “freedom levels” since 1950, and now provides freedom scores for over 195  
 
countries. 
 
 For this reason, this study utilizes Freedom House’s freedom ratings scale to  
 
track the progression of Ghana’s democratic strength over time. Freedom House  
 
measures democracy on a scale of one to seven, with one being most free and seven  
 
being least free. Further, the Freedom House scale is broken down into categories of  
 
“free” (scores of 1.0 to 2.5), “partly free” (scores of 3.0 to 5.0), and “not free” (scores of  
 
5.5 to 7.0). Scores—and therefore categories—of each country are determined by  
 
analyzing how each country scores in answering a “checklist” of political rights and civil  
 
liberties questions.  
 
The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: 
Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation 
(4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civil liberties questions 
are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief  
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(4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law 
(4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are 
awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 
0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or 
liberties present. The political rights section also contains two 
additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional 
monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system 
provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, 
encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to 
petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the government or occupying 
power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or 
territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of 
another group?). (Freedom House 2012) 
 
Although Freedom House provides scores based on levels of freedom, their core  
 
argument about the significance of these scores is that freedom is most accomplishable  
 
within liberal and electoral democracies, democracies that score highly on the above  
 
political rights and civil liberties questions. Furthermore, they argue that countries that  
 
are free are full-fledged democracies. Because of this link between freedom and  
 
democracy, the freedom scores can be used for this study to demonstrate how Ghana has  
 
become more democratic in recent decades. Accordingly, Ghana’s freedom scores are  
 
analyzed for the years spanning from 1980 through 2012.  
 
 
 
The Right to Food, Food Security and Food Insecurity 
 
 Food security is a subcategory of human rights.  Thus, in studying food security,  
it is crucial to understand what human rights are and what they entail. Concern for human  
rights and recognition of the importance to protect people’s human rights emerged in  
1948 with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration  
states that all people regardless of race, gender, economic status, and location have the  
natural, God-given right to freedom, equality, and other such rights (The Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights 1948).  Specific rights are outlined in the articles of the  
Declaration. Most significant to this study is Article 25, which highlights the right to  
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food—and therefore food security—as a human right that should be attainable for all  
people. Article 25 is as follows:  
Article 25. 
 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food [my 
emphasis], clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to ecurity in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control. (The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948) 
  
 Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights   
(ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, states that all of  
mankind should have equal rights to economic, social, and cultural rights. The ICESCR is  
broken into five parts consisting of 31 articles. The Covenant and its articles emphasize  
the importance of equal human rights for all people and states that “human rights”  
includes self-determination, work and just working conditions, adequate living  
conditions, physical and mental health, and education. Most applicable to this study is  
Article 11 of Part III. Article 11 proclaims that all people should have the right to an  
adequate standard of living (discussed in more depth in “Food Security” below). To date,  
160 countries and territories have signed and ratified the Covenant. Ghana is one of these  
countries (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966).  
Spanning both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR, the right to  
adequate food is emphasized as being a requirement to achieving adequate health.  
Because nutrition and health are human rights, the theoretical framework and study of  
human rights in general is applicable to food security research.  
 According to Article 11 of the ICESCR, it is every state’s duty to provide  
 
“adequate food” to all people in order to ensure that they can eventually be free from  
 
hunger, and so that the country as a whole can achieve successful food security levels.  
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Every person has the right to food and this right should not be threatened, restricted or  
 
prohibited by any person or government. Article 11 establishes that all people have the  
 
“right to adequate food… [and] the fundamental right of everyone to be free from  
 
hunger” (ICESCR 1966). Furthermore, it presents the following as a few of the many  
 
possible efforts that should be taken up in the name of the right to food and food security:  
 
“improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full  
 
use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles  
 
of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve  
 
the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources” (ICESCR 1966).  
 
 Looking specifically at “food security,” this study defines the term according to  
 
the World Health Organization’s definition and characterization. Food security exists  
 
when all people at all times (my emphasis) have access to sufficient, 
safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.’ Food 
security is built on three pillars: 
 
Food availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent 
basis. 
 Food access: having sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for 
a nutritious diet. 
Food use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition and 
care, as  well as adequate water and sanitation. (WHO 2012) 
Scholars, such as Amartya Sen, who study the issue of food security often focus  
first on understanding food insecurity struggles in order to better understand how to  
improve food security levels within a given state. For instance, Sen focuses most of his  
work, elaborated on below, on the study of why democracy affects famine levels  
within a given state. However, the existence of lesser forms of food insecurity within  
countries and regions begs the question if democracy impacts other forms of food  
insecurity. Likely, researching the relationship between democracy and food security  
more generally may be beneficial to states of varying food security levels. For this  
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reason, this study takes into consideration the possibility that a relationship exists  
between democracy and other levels of food stress that are not as severe as famine.  
Accordingly then, defining “food insecurity,” and describing the varying intensities of  
food insecurity, is as important to this study as defining food security.  
 Within existing scholarship, “food insecurity” is often used as an umbrella term  
for undernourishment, severe undernourishment, famine threat, and famine. It serves this  
purpose because most definitions of food insecurity are vague so as to apply to a  
multitude of varying degrees of food stress. Sue Ann Anderson of The American Institute  
of Nutrition provides perhaps the best explanation of food insecurity with her all- 
encompassing definition that is applicable across different cultures, countries, and times:  
“Food insecurity exists whenever the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods  
in socially acceptable ways is limited or uncertain”(Anderson 1990, 1560). The keywords  
within this definition— “availability,” “adequate,” “safe,” “socially acceptable ways,”  
“limited,” and “uncertain” —show that the classification of food insecurity is purposely  
vague and rightly applies to states experiencing malnutrition just as it does to states  
experiencing famine, a much more serious form of food stress. As Anderson explains in  
“Core Indicators of Nutritional State for Difficult-to-Sample Populations,” “food  
insecurity” is a new and evolving term used by many scholars to describe a range of  
different types of food stress. Countries do not have to experience such an extreme type  
of food stress as famine to be considered a country experiencing food insecurity. Rather,  
food insecurity applies to situations with any form of inability to acquire safe and  
acceptable food. Therefore, studying “food security” and “food insecurity” allows for a  
more inclusive analysis of how and why democracy impacts many forms of food stress,  
resulting in a better understanding of the impact of democracy on food security levels  
more generally.  
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Review of the Theoretical Literature 
 Again, because food security is a very specific and narrow human rights issue,  
 
this thesis’ corresponding literature is heavily rooted in existing expansive studies of  
 
human rights and health. Because human rights, health, and food security are similar and  
 
often interrelated, the human rights and health literature can be applied to the more  
 
specific focus of food security. Simply, this study takes a wide theoretical approach and  
 
applies it to the more specific sub-category of food security. In addition to the analyses of  
 
human rights and health literature, this study discusses literature pertaining specifically to  
 
food security. 
 
 Since the Cold War, and the steady increase of democratization worldwide, the 
discipline of political science has seen a growth in scholarship that promotes democracy 
as being the most successful, citizen-centered and human rights supportive form of 
government (Sen 1999a). Furthermore, the discipline has witnessed a merge of the study 
of democracy and the study of human rights and the debate as to whether or not 
democracy and human rights are independent of each other, or if they are more similar 
and interrelated than previously understood (Beetham 1999; Beetham 1997). This debate 
continues to be a growing interest among democracy supporters and scholars. Scholars 
such as David Beetham, Amartya Sen, Anthony Langlois, Julie Norman, and Paul 
Spicker argue that human rights are best implemented, most respected, and most often 
retained within democracies, and that other forms of government have generally not 
made equivalent achievements in human rights. An emphasis on actual rights and the 
capabilities of people to secure their rights equally and for an infinite period of time is at 
the core of this argument (Sen 1999a).  
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Democracy, Capability, and Human Rights 
 Beginning with the term capability, renowned scholar Amartya Sen argues that  
the most important aspect of acquiring human rights is not the actual rights themselves,  
but that all people have the capability of fairly, freely, and fearlessly accessing their  
rights. Without this, the rights themselves are irrelevant:  
the idea of capability is linked with substantive freedom, it gives a 
central role to a person’s actual ability to do the different things that 
she values doing. The capability approach focuses on human lives, and 
not just on the resources people have…by proposing a fundamental 
shift in the attention from the means of living to the actual 
opportunities a person has, the capability approach aims at a fairly 
radical change in the standard evaluative approaches…in political 
philosophy. (Sen 2009, 253) 
   
Sen proposes a new approach to the study of human rights that had escaped the discipline  
thus far: in order to spread human rights, we need to be first concerned with ensuring  
that all people have the consistent and uninterrupted capability of accessing these human  
rights. While the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar doctrines such  
as the ICESCR agree that all humans have a God-given right to freedom, equality, and  
other such rights, ensuring “the right to human rights” is the first step in making these  
proclaimed rights a reality (Nussbaum 2007).   
 Furthering Sen’s findings, Siddiqur Rahman Osmani highlights that ensuring  
capability and, in turn, human rights is primarily the responsibility of the state and is  
dependent on the state’s commitment to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights.  
Using the right to food as an example, he expounds that  
the duty to respect entails that the state must not do anything to deprive 
people of their access to food…the duty to protect goes one step further 
by requiring the state not only to refrain from violating people’s right to 
food, but also to prevent third parties from violating it…the duty to 
fulfil goes even further in extending the state’s obligation. It is then the 
obligation of the state to create the conditions—through economic and 
other policies—that would enable the people to acquire the food they 
need. (Osmani 210) 
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Capability then is essential to obtaining human rights and, therefore, citizen well-being  
because it provides all citizens with the freedom and opportunity to achieve these  
outcomes (Strauss and Horsten 2013).  
 Herein, we can see the significance of democracy in achieving capability and 
human rights. Capability itself is rooted within democracy because of democracy’s 
political structure and governmental structure. Through these structures, citizens have the 
capability to acquire and maintain human rights via freedoms and opportunities such as 
free and fair elections, lobbying, voting, representative government, checks and balances, 
the rule of law, a free and equal opportunity environment to fearlessly assemble and 
express interests, opinions, and values, etc. (United Nations 2013a).  
 Skeptics of this idea, known as separationist theorists, argue that there is no 
inherent relationship between democracy and the respect of human rights. Instead, 
scholars such as Andrew Nathan (1997) and Jack Donnelly (1999) believe that non-
democracies can and do uphold human rights. Furthermore, they see the unification of 
these two notions in existing scholarship to be a Western-centric notion and tactic to push 
democratization and western ideals on other regions and countries. They urge human 
rights scholars to separate these two notions. However, separationist theorists fail to 
recognize the underlying connection between capability and human rights and that 
capability is subject to one’s ability to control one’s own destiny via politics and 
governmental institutions (Ebadi 2013; United Nations 2013a). In non-democracies, 
political control and access to human rights are completely dependent on the control of an 
authoritarian leader (Poe and Tate 1994). Such a system of government eliminates 
capability and therefore limits human rights.   
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 Not only do non-democratic states limit rights but they also only provide “human 
standards or norms,” not human rights themselves. In non-democracies, the lack of 
citizen rule, self-determination, and endless capability can at most only provide “human 
norms.” Because authoritarian rulers can choose to limit human rights at any time, the 
upholding of human rights in these countries is always subject to change and limitations: 
“A so-called human right within an otherwise authoritarian governmental system, is not a 
right as such. It is a condescension, a privilege, a long leash…still conceived as the 
property of the ruler, not of the people…being allowed or permitted to engage in a certain 
activity is a far cry from being entitled to it by way of right” (Langlois 2003, 1014-1015). 
Human rights norms in states that are run by even the most well-intentioned 
undemocratic rulers stand the chance of eventually experiencing severe and catastrophic 
change. Human rights cannot be forever implemented in a state within which there is a 
possibility or probability that at some point a malevolent ruler may take control and 
disregard the needs of the general population. Therefore, in non-democracies, human 
rights are subject to the intentions of the ruler (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). 
Democracy’s rule by the people is arguably the best counter to this insecurity because 
democracy—government by the people, for the people—means that the people can 
produce a constant, a demand, within their state that ensures that human rights are 
consistently priority. Therefore, we see human rights as actual rights in democratic states 
wherein capability and human rights in general are constant and self-determined 
(Langlois 2003; Norman 2005). 
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The Significance of Regime Type and Development Status 
 Corresponding literature specifically pertaining to the right to food security 
explains why food insecurity is a recurring problem in undemocratic countries. It is 
argued that countries struggling with issues of famine and other food related insecurities 
could reduce the concentration of this presence within their state, or even potentially 
eliminate food insecurity as a whole, by way of democratization (Smith 1998; Paarlberg 
2002; Lappé 2008). In analyzing why democratic countries generally have less food 
insecurity than undemocratic countries, a common argument about the implications of 
regime type emerges: democratic regimes are more threatened by famine and in turn, 
fight to suppress its impact on society. In “Why Half the Planet is Hungry,” scholar 
Amartya Sen argues that “in democratic countries, even very poor ones, the survival of 
the ruling government would be threatened by famine, since elections are not easy to win 
after famines; nor is it easy to withstand criticism of opposition parties and newspapers” 
(Sen 2002). Not only is it difficult for politicians and leaders to withstand criticism, but it 
is nearly impossible for them to escape the repercussions of criticism. Often, politicians 
that do not support the health needs and demands of the electorate, and do not address the 
electorate’s main concerns within their campaigns, are not elected. Likewise, the 
electorate will reject and, in turn, not re-elect the existing government officials and 
administrations as a whole who do not work to protect the electorate from famine 
(Spicker 2008; Huntington 1996).  
 Although the reality of food insecurity is of concern within all states and across 
all levels of stress, Sen argues that it is of gravest concern and most evident in non-
democratic underdeveloped countries specifically. As explained in Development as 
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Freedom, every human’s right to food is defined by his or her freedom to grow or buy an 
adequate amount of food (Sen 1999b: 161). Citizens of non-democracies can easily be 
denied their right to food even if food is plentiful. These citizens often experience 
malnutrition and starvation because they are not given access to the food around them 
(Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). Most often, many underdeveloped countries 
rely on small-scale agriculture for the country’s most profitable source of income 
influencing the country’s gross domestic product; however, in most of these states, 
agriculture is a form of profit, not a source of nutrition for citizens. This occurs because 
“the alienation of the rulers from those ruled…the social or political distance between the 
governors and the governed can play a crucial role in the nonprevention of the famine” 
(Sen 1999b: 170). Working to reduce and eliminate famine is an expensive and laborious 
task. For this reason, Sen and his supporters argue that democratization is necessary for 
the development of such underdeveloped countries.    
 However, scholars such as Marshall Wallace oppose Sen’s beliefs and argue that 
fighting famine is not unique to democracy and that the stability of authoritarian regimes 
can be equally threatened if they do not implement policies and actions that best suit 
society’s needs, in this case, if they do not work to suppress famine in society. Wallace 
argues that authoritarian regimes are just as inclined to fight famine because if they do 
not, the threat of rebellion or revolutionary activities may arise (Wallace 2011). For this 
reason, he argues that authoritarian governments need legitimacy in order to survive and 
are likely to implement policies and mechanisms to fight famine: “Ultimately, a loss of 
legitimacy tends to lead to the overthrow of the governing authority…it must be 
perceived by the people that they [authoritarian governing bodies and officials] are in fact  
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working to alleviate the population’s hunger…” (Wallace 2011, 1-2).  
 In his many studies on democracy and famine—especially in “Democratic 
Political Process and the Fight Against Famine”—Alex de Waal acts as the beacon of 
light in this debate. He effectively explains that the debate over which form of 
government fosters famine prevention and food security is not as simple as most existing 
scholarship implies. Rather, he explains that, 
The democracy-dictatorship distinction is of course not clear cut. There 
can be states with democratic processes and institutions that are not 
seeking support of certain  constituencies, and therefore are indifferent 
to their welfare (or lack of it), while some authoritarian states can 
derive legitimacy from their reduction of poverty and prevention of 
famine. (2000, 13)   
 
De Waal’s findings show that famine prevention and eradication is not intrinsic to any 
government. He argues that government must allow primary and secondary activism to 
occur in order to prevent or eliminate famine. Primary activism he takes to be the ability 
and right of citizens to assemble and rally for their collective interests. Secondary 
activism is the political involvement of outside organizations and institutions in realizing 
human rights (de Waal 2000).  He finds that democracy is more favorable when 
compared to authoritarian governments in fighting famine and lesser forms of food 
insecurity because its democratic mechanisms consent to and encourage primary and 
secondary activism, enabling grass-roots and top down efforts to form and most 
importantly, persevere. He provides examples of authoritarian regimes—China, Sudan, 
Kenya, and Ethiopia—that successfully instituted short-term famine elimination efforts 
but failed to sustain them long-term, all resulting in resurfacing famine. The section 
below provides a more detailed discussion of how democracy’s core mechanisms work to 
prevent and eradicate famine and lesser forms of food insecurity.  
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 While many political scientists credit factors such as economy, literacy, and  
nutritional status for high food security levels and overall health within a given state and 
argue that democracy alone may not have as equally strong of an impact, existing 
statistical findings show otherwise. The influence of regime type should not be 
discounted because its impact proves to continuously increase over time. Differently, 
factors such as economy, literacy, and nutritional status tend to slowly lose influential 
power over time and these factors’ benefits diminish accordingly. For instance, Franco, 
Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz’s regression analysis of food security levels across the world in 
1998—a study of 170 countries constituting 75 percent of the world’s countries—shows 
that democracy can have an independent, positive relationship with health. Economic 
factors, which are often argued to be conducive to higher levels of food security do not 
prove to have this same impact: “When all of these variables were taken into account, the 
economic ones lost their weight, thereby increasing the importance of the effect of 
democracy” (Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004, 1442).  
Furthermore, opposing arguments that belittle the significance of democracy often 
mistake democracy’s “lagged effect” for a complete lack of impact. They do not account 
for the fact that, although instituting democracy can have upwards of a three-year “lagged 
effect,” after this lag, states often experience that democracy has a positive and 
continuously improving impact on general health, food security, and life expectancy 
(Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000; Zweifel and Navia. 2000; Lake and Baum 
2001). Likely, democracy’s lagged effect occurs because democracy takes time to 
develop within any state. While it may not emerge as essential to achieving food security 
initially, its prioritization of human rights and equality shows that, in fact, democracy can 
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impact a state’s food security levels and that it has the potential to be one of the most 
significant factors in improving citizen health and life expectancy in underdeveloped 
countries (Lin et al. 2012).  
 The ways in which democracy tends to set the foundation for improving food  
 
security is especially apparent when comparing statistics pertaining to food security in  
 
democratic states to that of authoritarian states. In all, democracies are more successful in  
 
reducing malnutrition and other forms of food stress—when compared to authoritarian  
 
regimes—because democracy’s free and fair environment, accountability to the people,  
 
and representation of the middle and lower classes nurture an environment focused on  
 
making improvements to general health. Countries that are free tend to have the highest  
 
levels of health overall (London and Williams 1990; Moon and Dixon 1985; Wickrama  
 
and Mulford 1996). The same generalization cannot be said of authoritarian regimes  
 
because they do not offer a free and fair environment, government is not held accountable  
 
to the people, and the lower and middle classes are often left unrepresented within the  
 
political system (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006).  
  
 
 
How the Mechanisms of Democracy can Improve Food Security Levels  
 
 Although the abovementioned food security scholars and corresponding literature  
 
provide theoretical and empirical arguments as to why democracy fosters food security,  
 
elaboration on how democracy does so is necessary. Answering the question of “how  
 
democracy is conducive to food security” is rooted in understanding what mechanisms of  
 
governance are most conducive to food security. Within the field of political science, this  
 
is an obvious weakness of existing literature. Many studies provide findings that support  
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the argument that democracy has a positive impact on health and more specifically food  
 
security; however, these studies do not explain what mechanisms of democracy produce  
 
this positive impact. Research conducted by both Jalil Safaei and Franco, Álvarez-Dardet,  
 
and Ruiz identify this shortcoming. It is not sufficient enough to state that democracy  
 
improves food security but, instead, scholars need to expand upon existing research and  
 
show how this is the case (Safaei 2006; Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004). The  
 
main mechanisms that link democracy and food security are political stability and  
 
government effectiveness, and political participation and government accountability and  
 
proficiency.  
 
 
 
Political Stability and Government Effectiveness. In its entirety, political stability  
consists of and refers to ensuring that citizens live in an environment that is free of  
violence and allows citizens to assemble, vote, and take part in other forms of political  
participation discussed in Political Participation and Government Accountability and  
Proficiency below (see page 31). Democracy’s utilization of political stability features  
occurs in the form of a chain reaction wherein each feature is a prerequisite on the  
pathway to a more stable food security system (Goldsmith 1986; Goodell and Powelson  
1982; Khohli 1986; Sorensen 1991).  
 Democracy ensures that citizens live in an environment of political stability, free  
from violence. Democracy can help prevent what political theorists term “military 
famine,” the existence of famine as a direct result of internal, physical repression and 
violence. Craig Jenkins and Stephen J. Scanlan’s findings show that internal violence has 
a direct impact on increasing hunger rates and that democratization counters this hunger  
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because it promises an environment that is focused on prioritizing the physical needs of  
the people so that citizens have the physical capability to be politically involved in 
society (2001). Democracy cannot function if the people who are supposed to impact 
government the most (via voting, political assembly, and the like) are subject to violence, 
and as result, are afraid to be politically active and to make demands of government. 
Equally, democracy cannot function if these same people are treated so poorly that they 
are physically incapable of political participation (Dobel 1978; Keane 2004).  
  
Institutionalization and Political Stability. Attention must also be drawn to the  
 
significance of institutionalization in maintaining political stability, as Samuel P.  
 
Huntington terms “order.” In Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington presents  
 
a groundbreaking argument about political institutionalization and its impact on political  
 
order that is still viewed as being an relevant contribution to the subfield of comparative  
 
politics and the study of world order (Fukuyama 2011). First, he defines  
 
institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value  
 
and stability” (Huntington 1968, 12). He then explains that institutionalization is a  
 
requirement of achieving political stability (order) and preventing the emergence of  
 
political violence, regardless of government type. With this work being published during  
 
the “second reverse wave of democratization” (see Huntington’s The Third Wave:  
 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century), Huntington was not alone in believing  
 
that democracy (regime type) is not the most important factor in the quest for political  
 
order, especially among Third World countries. For Huntington, “the most important  
 
political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their  
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degree of government” (Huntington1968, 1). While democracy is the best case scenario,  
 
for most Third World countries of this time (1960s), efforts to modernize (like industrial  
 
countries) often facilitated rapid social changes but did not develop political institutions  
 
that could support the growth of these social developments. Without strong political  
 
institutions, these efforts can lead to political disorder and violence (Kurth 2009). Some  
 
scholars believe that Third World countries fall victim to this and are in turn less  
 
institutionalized (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001). For this reason, it is often argued that  
 
institutionalization in the Third World is not as easily attainable as it has been for  
 
industrialized countries and often comes with uncertainties (Lupu and Riedl 2012).  
 
Huntington attributes that for these countries, institutionalization may be more achievable  
 
if they do not push modernization and democratization as the only way to achieve  
 
institutionalization and in turn political stability (order) (1968).  
 
 However, some scholars still emphasize that while we cannot expect all Third   
World countries to modernize and democratize in order to institutionalize in the same  
way that industrialized countries have, we also cannot presume that they are all incapable  
of doing so. Scholars such as Adeje (2013), Mainwaring (1998), and Weissenbach (2010)  
have studied the relationship between democracy and institutionalization of political  
parties and have found that there is a connection between democracy and  
institutionalization because the components of institutionalization are also significant to  
and are requirements of a stable democracy:  
Institutionalization of a party system is vital for the success of a 
democratic system…they [political parties] are the main tool by which 
democracy is introduced and maintained in modern politics…Without 
strong political parties, politics is reduced to unlimited opportunism 
and the blatant self-serving interest of politicians who may derail the 
nation-building process and the democratic entrenchment…(Abeje 
2013) 
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Therefore, these scholars note that institutionalization is crucial in maintaining  
political order and stability within democracies, particularly within the Third World.  
Ghana’s political stability transformation and institutionalization is representative of this  
argument and more importantly, is an instance in which institutionalization occurred out  
of democratization and fostered political stability. This is addressed on page 80 of the  
case study.  
 
 
Political Stability and Food Security. In applying existing findings on political stability, 
the absence of violence, and political institutionalization to the study of food security 
concerns, scholars have largely found that there is a relationship between political 
stability and food security:  
Food security and political stability are often inextricably linked in 
many countries. Historically, significant malnutrition and famine have 
been caused by the disruption of food supplies through wars and civil 
strife…yet, the concepts of food security and political stability are often 
mutually dependent and reinforcing. Food security, for example, can 
influence the political stability of countries. Simultaneously, political 
instability (such as wars or other forms of civil strife) can influence 
food security. (Smith 1998)  
 
The differences in political stability and food security successes between non-
democracies and democracies can be seen in the following manners. First, within non-
democracies, violence produces an environment of conflict that makes food security 
relatively impossible: “Conflict clearly causes food insecurity…conflict can destroy up to 
90 percent of GDP…conflict can undermine decades’ worth of development. Conflicts 
further compound the problems of infant mortality by encouraging governments to divert 
funds from social priorities to military spending” (Pinstrup-Anderson and Watson II 
2001, 261). In many non-democratic states wherein internal violence exists, such 
violence most often prevents the success of food security efforts because it hinders 
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society’s ability to focus attention on food security efforts. In violent states experiencing 
either internal violence or civil conflict, land is not easily accessible for the purposes of 
farming, agriculture yields are not as abundant, and crops are not equally accessible to all 
citizens because agricultural work conducted by citizens is interrupted by the hardships of 
living in a violent environment (Verwimp 2012; De Soysa et al). Such hardships may 
include but are not limited to emotional trauma, physical illnesses and abuses, and the 
need to concentrate on one’s own survival (Safaei 2006). Providing statistical support of 
why violence constrains agricultural production and distribution in Africa specifically, 
Robert L. Paarlberg finds that  
violent conflict reduces agricultural productivity and compromised 
secure access to food…countries experiencing conflict in Africa…tend 
to experience a significant drop in food production. They produce on 
average 12.4 percent less food per capita in war years than in 
peacetime. A comparison of actual historical food production in Africa 
after 1980 to a “peace adjusted trend” shows that peace would have 
added 2-5 percent to the continent’s total food production per year. 
(2002, 32) 
 
These findings show that food accessibility in violent, largely authoritarian states is a 
multifaceted concern. Preluding Sen’s finding that famine is often a result of a lack of 
capability to access nutritious food is the reality that capability is not possible without the 
existence of adequate yields to begin with. The more limited the yields, the more 
restrictive government may be on the distribution of these yields to citizens. A violent 
atmosphere that restricts fruitful yields can have a devastating impact on food security 
among citizens (Messer, Cohen, and D’Costa 1998).    
 Differently, the democratic focus on ensuring that citizens live within a 
nonviolent society provides the potential for higher yields and the equal distribution of 
safe foods because the strength of the democratic state relies on a healthy, fearless, and 
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active electorate. For these reasons, democracy is best sustained when safety, health and 
food security are a priority (Safaei 2006). To ensure the survival of democracy, it is the 
general obligation of a democratic state to suppress violence in an effort to ensure 
political stability. The degree to which democratic states take this obligation seriously 
can be seen in the fact that these states tend to implement more social security and social 
equity policies and programs focused on improving citizen health rates than do non-
democracies. As Safaei elaborates:  
…out of concern for the poor and less privileged groups or mainly in 
response to the strong demands by organized labor, many countries 
have designed various social security/insurance plans to ensure some 
degree of social equity…countries with higher degrees of democracy 
and social conscience, as reflected in their…less stratified social 
structure, tend to provide more generous social security programs. 
(2006, 772) 
 
A democratic state wherein citizens are safe and have the physical strength to be 
politically involved impacts political participation levels, which has a positive effect on 
food security as discussed in the next section.  
 In terms of government effectiveness, democracy prioritizes and works to 
implement the following efforts that improve good governance and can increase food 
security levels: control of corruption, the rule of law, and the division of power. The 
existence of internal corruption within a state can perpetuate the suppression and 
oppression of the lower classes and, correspondingly, those living in poverty and with 
significant food insecurity (Kaufmann 1997; Svensson 2005). Directly pertaining to the 
general population’s food security levels, corruption is one of the greatest causes of 
recurring low health rates within society. This is a common finding within authoritarian 
regimes wherein all power is held within the hands of a small percentage of the 
population, the social and political elite (Ruger 2005). As Pinstrup-Anderson and Watson 
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explain, this is the case because, within corrupt authoritarian states, the government and 
its leaders have a monopoly of power and often choose to distribute their attention to 
those individuals that are able and willing to bribe them. This leaves the majority of 
citizens with little impact on government and without the health and food security 
assistance that they need from the national government because assistance does not 
trickle down to the lower classes. The ensuing consequences are as follows:   
More corrupt countries tend to have lower GDP/capita, lower human 
capital…they are  generally less open to imports…reduce pro-poor 
growth and agricultural investments. The poorest people, minorities, 
and women are often excluded from government services, and NGOs 
that strive to reach the poor are often unable to reach the ultra poor who 
suffer from social exclusion. (Pinstrup-Anderson and Watson II 2001, 
257-60) 
All of these factors have a distressing influence on food security and limit the extent to  
which the government works and succeeds in producing acceptable food security levels.  
 Democracy and its internalization of the rule of law and separation of powers  
work to weaken government corruption and to prioritize human health. First, the  
democratic rule of law requires that all citizens are equally subject to rules and laws and  
are not merely subject to the demands of one overly powerful individual (United Nations  
Office on Drugs and Crime 2012). What differentiates democracy’s rule of law from the  
common practices of authoritarian regimes is that all government officials and leaders are  
equally subject to the laws that they implement in society and the laws that predate their  
time in office. This creates an environment that revolves around the golden rule of using  
government to better the lives of not only themselves, but of all others (O’Brien, Greene,  
and McQuoid-Mason 1994). This can directly improve food security within the state  
because officials who want to ensure their own health and wellbeing will focus attention  
on implementing policies that spotlight health and food security improvements. These  
policies, in turn, will trickle down to all classes of society. Holding the government  
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accountable to the rule of law and separating power among the executive, legislative, and  
judicial branches, prevents one branch of government from becoming too powerful and  
from prioritizing their own needs over the needs of the general public (Abbassi 2013).  
 In addition to being legally bound to abide by the rule of law, democracies are  
often recognized as being ethically committed to equally distributing social services  
within society, including the distribution of healthy, safe foods and other healthy living  
services. Scholars Wise and Sainsbury explain that democracy’s obligation to the  
separation of powers, the rule of law, and the equal distribution of services in general,  
collectively create a more food secure environment than many non-democratic regimes:  
“more potential actions are generated for consideration, there is better monitoring and  
control of government and government bureaucracies, decisions are more likely to reflect  
the wishes of the majority, and hence government decisions are more likely to be health  
promoting” (Wise and Sainsbury 2007, 181).  
 
Political Participation and Government Accountability and Proficiency. Lastly,  
democracy’s potential to produce adequate food security levels is largely due to its  
inherent “political participation and government accountability and proficiency”  
mechanism. In the context of democracy, this mechanism refers to the extent to which  
citizens can take part in and make a change to their country’s political arena and how  
government acts as the voice of these citizens when making policy. Citizens can use  
political participation to demand pro-poor and hunger reduction policies and other food  
security efforts. For instance, in underdeveloped democracies with high poverty levels (as 
is the case in Ghana’s history), political participation works to ensure that political 
figures and candidates prioritize “pro-poor growth” and health. Pro-poor growth refers to  
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“growth that is good for the poor” (DFID 2004). While the general definition of “pro-
poor growth” is vague, it leaves room to assess how health and food security directly fit 
within pro-poor efforts. If a large population of a democratic state is living in poverty—
which is common within underdeveloped countries—that population has the ability to 
directly improve their food security status via political demands, mass assembly, and 
press outlets. This overarching process is termed “food democracy.” In this sense, poor 
citizens are not “mere recipients or passive targets of government” and are instead 
“agents with knowledge, assets, and goals” (Pinstrup-Anderson and Watson II 2001, 
252). The extent of food security concerns among the electorate becomes more evident 
and so does the powerful impact that the political participation of society has on 
addressing these concerns and changing the food system for the better. There is  
political pressure to ensure ‘greater access and collective benefit from 
the food system’  so that it provides ‘the means to eat adequately, 
affordably, safely, humanely, and in ways one considers civil and 
culturally appropriate’…at the core of food democracy is the idea that 
people can and should be actively participating in shaping the food 
system, rather than remaining passive spectators on the sidelines. 
(Hassanein 2003, 79)  
      
This furthers the extent to which democracy’s political structure can increase a 
democratic state’s focus on food security improvements.  
 This can be seen in the ways in which government interacts with and recognizes 
the power of civil society in the decision making process, works to ensure equal 
opportunity and inclusive growth, and implements developmental policies and programs 
for the betterment of society (United Nations 2013b). Within any state, civil society 
groups have the potential to either be powerful, well-respected organizations of 
governance or weak as a consequence of being suppressed by government. What is most 
readily apparent is that civil society is oftentimes most influential within states that 
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prioritize the needs, desires, and demands of their citizens, most often seen as being 
democracies (Fox 2000; Diamond 1994). African studies scholar Michael Bratton implies 
that in most authoritarian regimes civil society efforts are heavily restricted by the 
government’s unsupportive, even threatening structure: “[Civil society] cannot flourish 
amid political disorder, lawlessness, and inadequate physical infrastructure, or 
intermittent essential services. Civic organizations depend upon the state for creation of 
certain basic conditions of existence” (Bratton 1989, 428). Differently, civil society’s 
place within democracy is strong and interactive because, within a democratic 
environment, supportive government provides opportunities and abilities that are not as 
readily available to civil society activists in authoritarian regimes. Democracy offers an 
environment in which civil society efforts can thrive, in which they are safe from 
violence, corruption, and oppression. Democracy offers 
space for public discourse, for the development of public values and 
public language, for the formation of the public self (the citizen), a 
space separate from the formal political sphere dominated by state 
power…its claims to democratic participation as a tool for development 
position it as a counterforce in development cooperation. (Apusiga 
2009, 4) 
 This might directly impact a society’s level of food security because democracy  
allows civil society groups that focus on issues of individual and collective safety to  
create grassroots efforts. Civil society organizations predominantly campaign for better  
treatment of the general public, and more explicitly the less fortunate. Therefore,  
democratic civil society organizations serve collectively to empower citizens to pursue  
their own development needs and goals (Hadenius and Uggla 1996). Democracy provides  
a direct route to helping these citizens with their food security needs by not only allowing  
the existence of food and health related civil society groups, but also by being  
accountable to and by interacting with these civil society activists to ensure equal  
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opportunity and inclusive growth. Accordingly, an open and interactive democratic  
government is favorable to stronger and more inclusive food security civil society groups  
(Levkoe 2006). These civil society organizations produce food security and health  
benefits and make demands of government that are advantageous for those who may have  
otherwise been marginalized by the state:  
The potential gains from community-driven development are large. It 
has the explicit object of reversing power relations in a manner that 
creates agency and voice for poor people, allowing them to have more 
control over development assistance. This is expected to make the 
allocation of development funds to be more responsive to their needs, 
improve the delivery of public goods and services, and strengthen the 
capabilities of the citizenry to undertake self-initiated development 
activities. (Apusiga 2009, 6) 
 Similarly, democracy is regularly credited for the establishment of modern  
agriculture and health-based government departments and organizations, the enactment of  
citizen-centered food and health policies, growth in rural infrastructure, improvements in  
food and nutrition education, and other efforts that improve “safe water supplies,  
sanitation, and sewage disposal systems…disease prevention and reduced mortality”  
(Safaei 2006, 772), all of which are prerequisites of food security. Together, these  
attributes are largely responsible for improved food security and general health rates. The  
energy that democratic governments exert in order to make these improvements in  
society are largely unparalleled by authoritarian regimes. These efforts are time  
consuming, expensive, and inherently beneficial to the general public, all of which are  
viewed as counterproductive to the self-serving nature of authoritarian government.  
However, focusing on these developmental policies and programs is not only a  
requirement of but is also favorable to democratic government because it has positive  
implications for the wellbeing of the electorate and, therefore, the strength of democracy  
itself (Pinstrup-Anderson and Watson II 2001). Each of democracy’s mechanisms—as  
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discussed in this section—have a direct, positive bearing on a state’s food security status.  
Furthermore, because of these mechanisms, it is probable that on average, democratic  
states have an advantage over authoritarian regimes regarding food security.  
 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
 Rooted in the above literature and research findings, the purpose of this thesis is  
to test whether or not findings about the benefits of democratic mechanisms hold true  
when applied to a longitudinal case study of Ghana and to determine if democracy is  
foremost responsible for Ghana’s food security improvements in recent decades. If so,  
why and how has this occurred and what evidence exists to show that Ghana’s  
democratic progress has been the key to the state’s growing food security levels? Chapter  
three explains why Ghana has been chosen for this study.  
 Expanding upon existing literature, this researcher hypothesizes that Ghana’s  
democratization and subsequent democratic progress since 1980 has been primarily  
responsible for Ghana’s improved food security levels. Likely, democratization did not  
have an immediate impact. More realistically, it is probable that political stability and  
government effectiveness, as well as political participation and government  
accountability and proficiency have nurtured the preconditions for gradually  
strengthening food security patterns. Analyzing existing data about Ghana’s democratic  
development and data regarding Ghana’s food security and health improvements will  
show that democracy has a positive effect on food security among the country’s general  
population. An “if-then” statement can likely be inferred in this specific case. If strength  
of democracy increases, then so does food security. The author also hypothesizes that the  
most important democratic variables impacting this causal relationship are the absence of  
violence, free and fair elections, freedom of the press, control of corruption, the rule of  
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law, civil society involvement, equal opportunity and inclusive growth, and a  
governmental emphasis on growth and development policies and programs.  
Developments within food security are expected to be directly associated with the  
strength of these democratic factors.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter provides theory and insight into how democracy can foster 
food security and more precisely that the connection between food security and 
democracy should not be deemed a coincidence. Rather, there is preliminary support of 
the argument that a relationship exists between these variables. However, the researcher 
needs to greatly expand on the above theory in order to provide evidence that a country’s 
democratic status can directly influence its food security status and that this theory 
applies to and is evidenced in reality. For this reason, chapter four below presents a case 
study of Ghana that shows that, in this specific case, democracy fosters food security 
more so than authoritarianism. Proving that Ghana has done more to uphold the right to 
food since becoming a democracy than it did when it was a non-democracy, chapters four 
and five present a longitudinal case study that depicts the development of food security 
efforts and successes over time.  
 
Using a Longitudinal Case Study as Opposed to a Large-N Study 
 In researching how Ghana’s democracy has fostered improved food security 
levels, the researcher selected a longitudinal case study as the study’s research method. A 
small-N case study approach was selected instead of a large-N study for many reasons. 
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First, as explained by scholars M. Heath and Caroline Tynan and also Garrett Glasgow, 
large-N studies are beneficial for research in which the purpose is to find patterns across 
a multitude of cases (2010; 2013). Scholars such as Andrew Martin point out that large-N 
studies provide more measurable validity than small-N studies and that small-N studies 
do not allow the researcher to make causal inferences. Undoubtedly, small-N studies do 
not easily provide quantifiable findings; however, in many cases, large-N studies are 
indicative of an “outsider” perspective (Health and Tynan 2010) in which it is very 
difficult to understand why the independent variable influences the dependent variable. 
For the purpose of showing how and why democracy has positively impacted food 
security levels in Ghana, a small-N study in the form of a longitudinal case study results 
in more detailed findings that provide an “insider” perspective of this issue.   
 A longitudinal approach for this case study and analyzing one country over time 
best limits the number of variables that could potentially alter findings. For instance, as 
Tom W. Smith explains in “Developing Comparable Questions in Cross-National 
Survey,” “…the very differences in language, culture, and social structure that make 
cross-national research so analytically valuable are the same that seriously hinder the 
achievement of measurement equivalency” (2003, 69). This explains one of the ways in 
which conducting a case study comparing and contrasting two or more states (either in a 
most similar or most different case design) could lead to weaknesses that may skew the 
reliability of the findings. Contrarily, looking at Ghana’s democratic progress over time 
entails comparing and contrasting its food security levels throughout history as it has 
advanced democratically, preventing this from occurring. Similarly, conducting a 
longitudinal case study allows the researcher to analyze and potentially rule out any other 
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factors that may account for food security improvements. For instance, in the case study 
below, economic development is studied very carefully to determine if improvements in 
the economy led to food security improvements instead of democratization.  
 
Why Ghana? 
 Ghana is the subject of this case study because of its unprecedented advancements 
in both democratic development and food security in the last two decades. The nation’s 
turnaround in its governing structure and food security improvements begs the question 
of if these variables occurred simultaneously by coincidence or if democracy has been the 
cause of improved food security levels. Simply put, is democracy the independent 
variable to the dependent variable of food security and, if so, why do we see this 
relationship? While this case study may not prove that democracy always fosters higher 
levels of food security, testing the relationship between these two variables may provide 
insight into the instances in which democracy facilitates higher levels of food security 
than that of non-democracies. As a result of this conclusion then, this case study may 
encourage scholars to revisit Amartya Sen’s findings about the positive impact of 
democracy on famine and to test if this applies to lesser forms of hunger in other nations 
today. Ghana then acts as a preliminary example and jumping off point for future 
research in this regard. 
 
Case Study Overview 
 This case study analyzes the shift in food security status that Ghana experienced 
from pre-democratization (pre-1992) to post-democratization (post-1992) in order to 
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determine how democracy positively impacted the shift. Have the democratic 
mechanisms discussed in chapter two created preconditions and the environment 
necessary to improve Ghana’s food security status as the theory claims they do? First, 
chapter four gives a brief history of Ghana’s governing systems and its many transitions 
and struggles for democracy from independence through today. Following this analysis, 
the scope of this study is narrowed to analyzing roughly a decade of pre-democratic 
government’s food security levels and efforts (1980-1992) and contrasting it to food 
security levels and efforts that emerged out of democracy (1992-2012). Doing so shows 
that Ghana’s non-democratic governments from 1980 until 1992 encouraged low food 
security levels while Ghana’s democratization and the sustainment and strengthening of 
this democracy has led to significant improvements in food security.  
 This section shows how Ghana’s non-democratic government of the 1980s  
implemented minimal food security policies and that, during this timeframe, food  
security and the well-being of the populace were not priority. Instead, this was a  
government that focused on the needs and desires of the few elite and on bettering the  
economy to improve the nation’s standing in the global marketplace. The literature shows  
that such a lack of government support had a severe impact on food insecurity levels and  
produced increased hunger and malnutrition. Sources include legislation, policy  
implementations such as the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), literature and data  
showing the livelihood and hunger struggles of farmers, data representing “brain-drain,”  
unemployment rates, and data showing the distortion of the pricing system and  
corresponding inflation.  
 The study presents existing data to provide quantitative support of these  
qualitative findings and to show that the lack of food and health policies and non- 
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democracy more generally had severe ramifications. Data includes the Domestic Food  
Price Level Index, Global Hunger Index (GHI), malnutrition and underweight  
percentages, and the Dietary Energy Supply (DES). The FAO’s Domestic Food Price  
Level Index is an index generated by dividing the Food Purchasing Power Parity (FPPP)  
by the General PPP so as to determine an index of the price of consumer food in a given  
country.  
 Similarly, GHI scores are calculated by adding up the proportion of the  
population that is undernourished (in percent), the prevalence of underweight in children  
younger than five (in percent), and the proportion of children dying before the age of five  
(in percent) and dividing these findings by three. Index scores range from 100 (most  
extreme hunger)—in which all of the population would be malnourished, all children  
under the age of five would be underweight, and all children would die before reaching  
the age of five—to 0 (no hunger), in which no one would be undernourished, no children  
under five years old would be underweight, and no children would die before the age of  
five. As the IFPRI explains, neither of these extreme scores are possible; however, they  
represent both ends of the index’s vast spectrum. The spectrum is broken down as  
follows: scores of 4.9 and below represent low hunger levels, scores of 5.0 to 9.9 are  
instances of “moderate hunger,” 10.0-19.9 are “serious hunger,” 20.0-29.9 are  
“alarming,” and 30.0 or greater are “extremely alarming” (IFPRI 2012). 
 The “percent of undernourished” factor for all four GHI years was calculated by 
averaging the percent over a three-year period (1990-1992, 1995-1997, 2000-2002, and  
2006-2008 respectively). The “prevalence of underweight in children younger than five 
years” was calculated by collecting data from the year that is closest to the given year or  
by averaging two years of data if there are two years closest to the year in question. For 
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example, for the year 1990, an average was taken from the years 1988 to 1992. The 
exception to this method is the measurement for 2012. In this case, an average was taken 
from the years 2005 to 2010 because at the time, this was the most current data available. 
Lastly, the “under-five mortality” factor for each year was taken from existing data on the 
mortality rates for under-five mortality rates for that given year. As before, the exception 
to this is the data presented for 2012. Here, the reference year is 2010 because again, this 
was the latest data made available at the time.  
 Lastly, DES refers to how much energy, in calories, is in the food that is available  
 
for consumption. Meeting the DES requirement means that on average, individuals are  
 
taking in enough calories, and therefore energy, per day to be considered healthy. The per  
 
capita DES requirement is 2,118 calories and when reached by the populace, leads to a  
 
more food secure state. (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). 
 
 Following the analysis of this data, the researcher used the same approach to 
analyze how democracy has impacted food security levels from 1992 to 2012. This 
section shows that in democratizing and progressively working to strengthen the existing 
democracy, Ghana’s government has introduced many food security policies that are 
aimed at directly improving the health and wellbeing of citizens. To remain consistent 
with the research design of the pre-democracy analysis, this section introduces the same 
qualitative sources—legislation, policy implementations, institutional developments and 
progress, and feedback from citizens. This section analyzes the following: surveys, 
Freedom House scores, news releases, Government of Ghana (GOG) documents, policies 
and legislation, and CSO programs. These sources show that, in the years after the 1992 
elections, there was a progressive reduction in malnutrition and hunger. Next, referring to 
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the following data shows that quantitative reports support the qualitative findings: the 
Domestic Food Price Level Index, GHI, malnutrition and underweight percentages, and 
DES. Lastly, this study concludes with a comprehensive analysis that discusses these 
findings explain about Ghana’s democratization and its link to food security advances.  
 
Overcoming Research Obstacles 
 As with any other study, studying the impact of democracy on food security levels 
comes with obstacles and potential research weaknesses. First, researchers have largely 
avoided this issue. Furthermore, food security is a newly emerging issue area within the 
discipline of political science, making it difficult to find corresponding research as to if 
democracy has an impact on food security. Also, the definition and characteristics of 
what constitutes “food security” are still largely up for debate. It is this researcher’s belief 
that the definition of food security by the FAO, provided in the literature review, gives 
the best insight into the multifaceted components of food security; however, not all 
scholars and organizations accept this definition as such. Therefore, the term “food 
security” is largely subjective, creating research difficulties because of the lack of 
consistency. Second, applying this issue to the specific case of Ghana means that the 
minimal existing literature becomes even sparser. In overcoming these research 
weaknesses, there is potential for this study to make a contribution to existing literature. 
It opens the door to future studies regarding this topic, with the possibility for future 
researchers to study if these findings are paralleled in any other states.  
 However, researching a topic that is new to the discipline of political science also 
comes with many other disadvantages and obstacles. It requires thorough research and  
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work with limited resources, which may cause other scholars such as separatists to 
question if there is enough evidence to support the finding that democracy does influence 
food security levels. This concern is furthered by the fact that, of existing studies, very 
few are quantitative and there is a large divide between the number of qualitative studies 
compared to quantitative ones, which may lead to further concerns regarding if it is 
possible to measure food security levels at all. To overcome these weaknesses, this study 
integrates arguably the best existing literature on the subject. For instance, it uses 
quantitative sources from Freedom House, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), all of which are renowned 
for their contributions to the study of food security issues and for their presence and aid 
in food insecure nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
            
            
            
            
PART TWO: GHANA - CASE STUDY, FINDINGS, AND ANALYSIS 
 
CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY: TOWARDS DEMOCRACY – GHANA’S PRE-DEMOCRATIZATION  
 
FOOD SECURITY STRUGGLES 
 
 
 
A Brief History 
 
“If we get self-government,…we'll transform the Gold Coast into a 
paradise in 10 years."– Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, in Commanding Heights 
 
 
Ghana, originally named the British Crown Colony of the Gold Coast by its 
British colonizers, was the first African colony to achieve independence from Great 
Britain on March 6, 1957 (BBC News 2008). A colony of Great Britain since 1874, 
Ghana’s history is heavily embedded not only in its struggle for independence from Great 
Britain but also its own subsequent fight to establish democracy, which it did not fully 
achieve until 1992 (Aidoo 2006). As shown in the introductory quotation to Chapter IV 
above, Ghanaians were heavily optimistic that achieving independence from Great 
Britain would result in an almost immediate improvement in governance, economic 
status, general health, and livelihood more generally. However, this belief was unfounded 
and as history has proven, the reality of Ghana’s struggle to democratize and to improve  
its political and economic systems would not be an easy feat. The following two sections  
provide a brief chronological summary of Ghana’s history and highlight its path to 
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becoming a true democracy. 
 
The First Thirty-Five Years 
 A leading advocate for, and arguably the predominant catalyst of, the fight for 
Ghana’s independence from Great Britain was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972), a 
native of Ghana whose interest in the benefits of democracy peeked during his Masters 
and Doctoral studies at the University of Pennsylvania (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). 
Believing that all Africans should have the right to self-government and ever-growing 
stability and prosperity, Nkrumah was a persistent advocate of the Pan-Africanist 
Movement of 1900 to 1945 (Kwame Nkrumah Academy 2013; Mboukou 1983). This 
movement—which stresses the importance of African brotherhood and the joint fight of 
African states to achieve independence from colonization, to improve the economic status 
of all countries, and to better the lives of all Africans—fostered Nkrumah’s push for 
Ghanaian independence and his ideology that once independent, “we'll transform the 
Gold Coast into a paradise in 10 years” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Ghanaian natives 
started to support and strive for these ideals, began uprising against their British 
oppressors, and initiated demands for independence. After years of continuous opposition 
via “positive action,” such as non-violent strikes and protests, persistence resulted in the 
secession of Great Britain’s rule and a newly independent Ghana. Immediately following 
independence, Nkrumah was named Ghana’s first Prime Minister of native origin. Three 
short years later in 1960, Nkrumah initiated the formation of a new constitution, which 
ushered in Ghana’s First Republic, democratic presidential elections, and first president, 
Nkrumah (Birmingham 1998).  
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Unfortunately for the Ghanaian people, this progress was short-lived. Nkrumah’s 
perceivably democratic efforts were soon followed by questionable and highly 
controversial political efforts. Most notably, in 1964, Nkrumah passed a constitutional 
amendment making the Convention People’s Party (CPP) the sole political party in 
Ghana and making himself president for the remainder of his life, forcing Ghana into a 
state of dictatorship (Omari 1972). Finding this to be contrary to Ghana’s original 
intentions for independence, the Ghanaian populace began to oppose him and lost 
confidence in the state’s ability to be a true democracy. As a result of society’s growing 
resentment and distrust of Nkrumah, members of the National Liberation Council (NLC) 
utilized a violent but successful military coup and overthrew Nkrumah and the CPP on 
February 24, 1966 (Adekson 1976).  
 The leaders of this coup justified their actions as being necessary for Ghana’s  
 
potential as a democracy. Arguing that Nkrumah’s rule regressed Ghana’s progress, the  
 
NLC put into practice democratic mechanisms that would develop a more secure and  
 
democratic government (Austin 1976). Most importantly, the NLC prioritized creating a  
 
new constitution as part of the coming of the Second Republic of Ghana. Furthermore,  
 
the NLC acted as a temporary executive governing body consisting of four military  
 
officials and four police officers whose overall purpose was to re-solidify Ghana as a  
 
democracy and to then ease in a new democratic government via multi-party election. In  
 
August of 1969, a presidential election took place and five political parties participated,  
 
with the victor being Kofi A. Busia of the Progress Party (PP) who subsequently became  
 
the new Prime Minister. Shortly after, Chief Justice Edward Akufo Addo was elected  
 
president by the electoral college (Gocking 2005). This marked the beginning of the brief  
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Second Republic. 
 
  Because this government came as a direct result of the NLC’s efforts to establish  
 
democracy, the electorate on average believed that this new administration would focus  
 
more on the needs of average citizens and less on the desires of society’s few elite.  
 
However, again, Ghana’s citizens were denied a stable democracy, as had been promised  
 
to them. The debt that Ghana accumulated at the hands of Nkrumah created an  
 
inescapable, debilitating economic struggle that only continued to escalate during Busia’s  
 
years as Prime Minister. Furthermore, Busia implemented policies that significantly  
 
reduced support from the populace:  
 
First, the Progress Party regime had been guilty of extreme economic 
mismanagement….Second it had consistently acted against the interests 
and wishes of one important social formation after another: the civil 
servants, the farmers, the business community, the unions, the 
press….Third, it had been acting in defiance of the democratic 
constitution which it had sworn to uphold. (Goldsworthy 1973, 8)   
 
Combined, these controversies triggered another military coup in 1972, this time by  
 
the National Redemption Council (NRC), ending the Second Republic.  
 
 Similarly to the military coup of the NLC in 1966, the NRC reasoned that this  
 
coup was necessary to reestablish a government of the people and to refocus government  
 
on prioritizing the needs of the general public. Initially, the NRC held community support  
 
because of its preliminary efforts to undo Busia’s unpopular economic policies. However,  
 
differently from the NLC, the NRC did not see democracy as a necessity. Instead, in  
 
1975, they retitled themselves as the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and transformed  
 
Ghana into a militarily governed state (Lumsden 1980).  At this point, it was clear that  
 
the SMC, like governments before it, would do little to solve the escalating financial  
 
burdens that loomed over the heads of citizens more than ever before. Citizens’ struggles  
 
as a result of this negligence were most evident in industry, transportation, food  
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production, and health declines: “Inflation was estimated to be as high as 300 percent that  
 
year. There were shortages of basic commodities, and cocoa production fell to half its  
 
1964 peak” (Library of Congress, 1995). Citizen disapproval mounted and in response,  
 
the SMC created anti-opposition policies, which strictly limited the media and other  
 
public opinion outlets. Rather than suppressing the people’s outrage, this intensified  
 
citizen demand for a return to civilian political participation and democracy.  
  
 Fearing this opposition, the SMC II—a new take on the original SMC that took  
 
hold of the government in July of 1978—agreed to hold a free and fair election and to  
 
recognize the victor as the new government of Ghana. This election occurred June 22,  
 
1979, and Dr. Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party (PNP) was elected president,  
 
beginning the Third Republic (Goldschmidt 1980). However, this democracy was the  
 
most transitory yet. As a new administration with a president that was also new to  
 
political office, Limann’s administration was subject to the emerging power and  
 
opposition of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a military-based party  
 
led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings who had years of experience in federal  
 
politics and government and had been attempting unsuccessful coups against SMC I and  
 
SMC II. On December 31, 1981—only two years into the PNP administration—the  
 
AFRC executed a successful coup that ended the PNP’s rule and the Third Republic  
 
(GlobalSecurity.org 2011).  
 
 From 1982 through 1987, Rawlings held governing power by way of the  
 
Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), the former AFRC. During his first term,  
 
Rawlings implemented some democratic provisions and policies, such as the  
 
establishment of “District Assemblies,” democratically elected local divisions of  
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government that interacted with and impacted federal government policymaking  
 
(International Business Publications, USA 2012). He also created the National  
 
Commission for Democracy (NCD), which aimed to increase the extent to which  
 
government was responsive to the needs and wants of the people. This commission relied  
 
heavily on public, political participation and included citizen members (Leite et al. 2000).  
 
 Additionally, Rawlings and the PNDC established Ghana’s first interaction with  
 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fundy (IMF) to get Ghana the  
 
economic assistance that it needed to reduce its high levels of debt: 
 
…the PNDC drew up a program of financial reform that closely 
followed standard IMF austerity programs but tailored to Ghanaian 
reality. To the PNDC leadership, it was the only way to get the IMF to 
provide the loans that the country so desperately needed…by 1985 
Ghana had become the model for other African countries that were 
seeking to follow the IMF and the World Bank’s prescriptions for 
overcoming economic decline…this turnaround was a considerable 
achievement. (Gocking 2005, 194) 
 
Because of this and the many other economic recovery efforts of the PNDC, Ghana saw  
 
improvements in its economy. However, the same cannot be said for the state’s food  
 
security levels. Also, because he was not democratically elected to office, Rawlings’ first  
 
term did not constitute a democracy. Furthermore, even though Rawlings implemented  
 
some democratic efforts, he instituted equally as many undemocratic policies such as  
 
banning political parties other than the PNDC, monitoring religious groups, and  
 
eliminating independent press sources, all as a way to control PNDC opposition. This  
 
ultimately led the general public to increased feelings of unease and distrust. Concerns  
 
mounted about whether the PNDC’s main priority was protecting the people or protecting  
 
its place in government (Adedeji, J.L. 2001).  
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1992 to Present: Becoming a True, Functioning Democracy 
 
 As it had during its struggle for independence from Great Britain in the 1950s, the  
 
Ghanaian populace once again began to make strong, persistent demands for legitimate,  
 
democratic government. However, this time persistence paid off and democracy was  
 
achieved and sustained. The NCD, with the permission of Rawlings, conducted field  
 
research to get an honest, non-coerced answer to what form of government the general  
 
public wanted. Citizen responses to nationwide meetings showed that on average the  
 
public strongly preferred a multi-party government to any other form of government  
 
(IDEG 2007a). In response, the NCD and Rawlings’ administration established the  
 
Consultative Assembly, which was responsible for proposing changes that should be  
 
made to previous constitutions (of 1957, 1969, and 1979). This was the first step in  
 
creating an improved, sustainable, and democratic constitution. On April 28, 1992, via a  
 
referendum, the general public accepted the Consultative Assembly’s proposed  
 
constitutional changes and a new constitution was created (GhanaWeb 1994;  
 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2010).  
  
 First and foremost, the 1992 Constitution changed Ghana’s governing system by  
 
formally declaring Ghana a full-fledged democracy:  
 
The legal system is based on the constitution, Ghanaian common law, 
statutory enactments of parliament, and assimilated rules of customary 
(traditional) law. The 1992 constitution, like previous constitutions, 
guarantees the institution of chieftaincy together with its traditional 
councils as established by customary law and usage. (Library of 
Congress 1995)  
 
However, differently from previous constitutions, this constitution, still in place today,  
 
shows the heavy influence of the United States Constitution, as exemplified by the  
 
following changes: Ghana would from then on be jointly governed by 1) the executive  
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branch, consisting of a democratically elected president who serves a four-year term 
(with the possibility of being re-elected to one additional term), 2) the legislative branch 
which is vested in the hands of the National Parliament, and 3) a judicial branch made up 
of federal and local courts that have independent power from the executive and 
legislative branches (Commonwealth Governance 2014; United States Department of 
State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2011). In its previous attempts at 
democracy, Ghana elected presidents via democratic elections; yet, the 1992 constitution 
introduced Ghana to new democratic practices that it had yet to experience: equal 
opportunity and equal distribution of powers. This change warrants that no president 
could establish himself as a dictator and that no other power could overthrow the 
presiding administration via military coup. With the branches of government working 
with equal power to each other and the emerging power of political actors, all people 
have the ability to change Ghana’s governing system via democratic, non-violent means. 
Expanding upon these initial changes, the Constitution also guarantees human rights to 
all Ghanaian people, something that had not been promised or ensured before (Human 
Rights Advocacy Centre 2013; Library of Congress 1995).   
 Following the creation of the 1992 Constitution, the other pieces of Ghana’s  
 
democratic progress began to fall into place. On November 3, 1992, by way of free  
 
and fair democratic elections, Rawlings was elected president and the NDC remained  
 
the governing administration. Rawlings and his Vice President K.N. Arkaah were  
 
inaugurated on January 7, 1993, beginning the Fourth Republic. In 1996, Rawlings was  
 
re-elected to his second term as president: “Under Jerry Rawlings' rule, Ghana became  
 
the most politically stable and prosperous nation in West Africa and provided a model of  
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development for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa” (GhanaWeb 1994). However, the  
 
greatest proof that Ghana was functioning as a successful democracy came in December  
 
of 2000 with the election and swearing in of a new president, John A. Kufuor of the New  
 
Patriotic Party (NPP) (Smith 2002).  
 
 Of all elections leading up to this point, arguably this was the most significant and  
 
was the greatest test of Ghana’s strength as a democracy. If Rawlings had at any point  
 
recanted his stance on democracy and declared himself “president for life” as Nkrumah  
 
did, democracy would have collapsed. Similarly, if opposing parties, candidates, military  
 
groups, or citizens, initiated violent (and successful) uprisings, democracy would have  
 
crumbled. As Ghana’s history has proven, violent coups were the device by which all  
 
previous democracies ended (BBC News 2013). Because the Fourth Republic was still in  
 
its infancy during the 2000 elections, if a coup emerged, this republic would have had a  
 
high risk of ending in the same manner as its predecessors. Instead, the 2000 election was  
 
an instance of development and democratic strength and “marked the first peaceful  
 
democratic transition of power in Ghana since the country's independence in 1957”  
 
(Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 2012).     
 
 In December of 2004, Kufuor was re-elected for a second term. Perhaps the most  
 
successful focuses of Kufuor’s governing strategy were his prioritization of the needs of  
 
all citizens regardless of their place in society, his lack of tolerance for any government  
 
corruption, and his greatest emphasis on establishing unity across Ghana’s regions and  
 
cultures, all things that had been longstanding causes of conflict (Agyeman-Duah 2003).  
 
His ideological choices and emphases showed his commitment to implementing  
 
democratic government. He proved to the populace that Ghana had adopted true, all- 
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encompassing democracy. Proof of this can be seen in the following quotation from  
 
Gocking’s The History of Ghana:  
 
He [Kufuor] called upon Ghana’s business people to lead an economic 
transformation of the country…indicative of the new country’s 
determination to create unity, it [the administration] offered positions to 
leaders of opposing parties…ironically, it was one of  their ministers 
who provided them with their first opportunity to demonstrate ‘zero 
tolerance for corruption.’ (2005, 257-259)  
 
Democratic measures did not cease with the end of this administration. Rather, the 
2008 election and the swearing-in of President John Evans Atta Mills in 2009 
strengthened Ghana’s democracy. The fact that Ghana remained a stable democracy 
during the 2008 election and did not experience violent protest or opposition is a 
testament to the extent to which Ghanaians (government officials, political actors, and the 
general public) believe in the benefits and necessity of democracy in this state. This 
election was the “closest” election in Ghana’s short democratic history with Mills  
prevailing by a margin of less than one percent (Nossiter 2012). Like Kufuor, Mills 
focused his presidency on improving the livelihood of the citizenry, improving the 
economy, and advancing Ghana’s place in the global community: “in recent years, oil 
discoveries and a blossoming middle class have drawn waves of foreign capital…such 
investment helped make Ghana Africa's fastest-growing economy last year, expanding 
13.5% from a year earlier” (Hinshaw 2012).  
 Unfortunately, Mills’ presidential contribution to the nation was cut short by his 
untimely death on July 24, 2012. John Dramani Mahama, Mills’ vice-president and 
successor, was sworn into office that same day. Having only been in office for months 
as of yet, Mahama’s presidential actions and accomplishments have been justifiably 
limited; however, it is already apparent that Mahama is committed to following the 
democratic plans of Mills and upholding democracy more generally. Examples of this 
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can be seen in his focus on “Jobs, Stability, Development, and…WORKING FOR 
YOU” as proven by his expansion of the Better Ghana agenda which is discussed in 
depth below (The Presidency: Republic of Ghana 2014). Via the democratic 
administrations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Ghana has 
drastically improved its commitment to democracy and the focus of “government by the 
people, for the people.” Arguably, as the levels of democracy have increased and 
continue to increase, so have and will the levels of wellbeing, as exemplified by the 
corresponding ways in which democracy positively impacts food security levels as 
analyzed below.  
 
Learning from the Past to Shape the Present and Future 
 
 While Ghana’s democracy is only twenty-two years old—tracing back to 1992— 
 
already, the benefits of this transition are clear. Arguably, one of the most prominent  
 
benefits is the drastic increase Ghana has experienced in its levels of food security since  
 
the 1990s. What explains this? In analyzing how the theories and literature discussed in  
 
chapter two apply to Ghana, it is apparent that the argument about the mechanisms of  
 
democracy being conducive to higher levels of food security is a reality for Ghana.  
 
Ghana’s federal government has not always prioritized the health and wellness of its  
 
citizens and, as a result, food security levels were not always as high as they are now.  
 
This is most obvious when contrasting the different governing strategies and policies of  
 
the 1980s and early 1990s authoritarian regime to the subsequent democracy of the 1990s  
 
to present. This change in the government’s focus post-democratization shows that  
 
democracy’s commitments to serving the electorate have drastically improved the state’s  
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food security status. This study does not analyze the years prior to the 1980s because of a  
 
lack of available food security data. While Dietary Energy Supply (DES) data exists for  
 
the late 1960s and 1970s, it is one of very few Ghanaian food security sources that date  
 
further back than the 1980s. For instance, the FAO’s Food Price Level Index and the  
 
IFPRI’s Global Hunger Index (GHI) do not provide data for years previous to the 1980s.  
 
Because of this significant limitation, any findings and analysis comparing Ghana’s food  
 
security levels prior to the 1980s to post-democratization levels would be largely  
 
unfounded. Therefore, this study analyzes the years since 1980 and utilizes data that  
 
shows the food security developments over this time period.  
 
 
 
1980s Economic Improvements Provided Few Benefits for Average  
Citizens    
 
 Indisputably, economic improvements during the 1980s are often attributed by  
 
many scholars, such as Chad Leechor and Ishan Kapur et al., as being the radical turning 
point in Ghana’s growth and development because Rawlings and the PNDC pulled Ghana 
out of the debt it had been emerged in for decades. However, existing literature tends to 
overlook the many ways in which the 1980s economic policies advanced Ghana’s 
economy at the expense of the general public. Rather than using these policies to 
simultaneously improve the wellbeing of Ghana’s citizens by tackling poverty and 
malnutrition levels, Rawlings largely ignored these concerns during his years of 
authoritarian rule. The extent to which Rawlings purposely ignored social issues and 
focused all of his attention on improving the state’s economy to improve its ranking in 
the global community is debatable. For instance, questions emerge as to whether or not 
he took this policy path because he did not care about the many social issues facing 
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Ghana and only cared about the state’s economic status, or if he took this path because he 
did care about the general public and thought that improving the economy was the initial 
step necessary to achieving improvements throughout all of society. The answer to this is 
largely held in the eye of the beholder. For instance, Kevin Shillington and John Adedeji 
argue that Rawlings introduced economic reform efforts to better address the needs, 
values, and wellbeing of citizens (1992; 2001). Opposingly, Kwamina Panford, scholar 
and critic of Shillington’s Ghana and the Rawlings Factor, insinuates that the Rawlings  
administration purposely prioritized economic growth over Ghanaians civil and political  
rights. He argues that citizen wellbeing was not an inherent effect of economic growth  
(Panford 1994).  
 Regardless of his intentions, Rawlings accomplished his goal of improving 
Ghana’s overall economy but he did not make equal improvements to the economic 
standing of Ghana’s citizens. Without doubt, the 1980s marked a time of drought and 
hardship; however, Rawlings’ lack of focus on the needs of citizens greatly exacerbated 
this hardship. Evidence supporting this finding and showing the extent to which 
authoritarianism hindered health and food security improvements lies in analyzing the 
policies and strategies that Rawlings implemented, as discussed extensively below.  
 
 
Transforming the Economy. After taking executive power in December of 1981,  
 
Rawlings and the PNDC were forced to immediately address the issue of Ghana’s  
 
deteriorating economy, which at the time was arguably in the worst condition of its  
 
history. With debt vastly exceeding the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), “the economy  
 
recorded an annual average growth of -2.2 percent between 1975 and 1982, with average  
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annual inflation of 64.9 percent and balance of payments deficit of $6.8 million over the  
 
same period” (Baah-Boateng 2004, 4). Like so many rulers before him, authoritarian and  
 
democratic, Rawlings proclaimed that Ghana had no choice but to focus its attention and  
 
resources on stabilizing what little was left of the economy. Taking on the burden of  
 
completely rebuilding the economy, one of Rawlings’ first policies was to establish a  
 
strategic plan that would transform Ghana from being a state heavily dependent on  
 
imports to one that was booming because of abundant exports: The Economic Recovery  
 
Program (ERP) of 1983.  
 
 
 
The IMF and Structural Adjustment Programs. The ERP grew out of the 1970s and  
 
1980s IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), rooted in neo- 
 
liberalism. While this thesis’ case study is about the progression of Ghana specifically, it  
 
must be acknowledged that Ghana was not the only country to take part in a SAP. The  
 
1980s marked an upswing in neo-liberalism, a political and economic ideology in support  
 
of economic globalization, open markets, and free trade:  
 
At its core is a belief in the free market and minimum barriers to the 
flow of goods, services and capital. It is an extension of the traditional 
liberal philosophy, which argues for a separation of politics and 
economics and that markets should be “free” from interference of 
government. (WHO 2014) 
 
At this time, countries all across the world, from first world to third world, were  
 
undergoing neo-liberal adjustment programs in the hopes of addressing international  
 
economic struggle. As acknowledged in “The IMF and the Silent Revolution,” third  
 
world countries were particularly vulnerable to severe economic hardship and the  
 
“international realities” of the economy. In response, many of these governments’  
 
economic and governing philosophies transformed drastically: “From a starting point at  
61 
 
which the state was viewed as holding a primary responsibility for controlling economic  
 
development, the "third world" gradually diminished and even rejected that role in favor  
 
of privatization and reliance on market incentives” (Boughton 2000).  
  
 While SAP goals intended to reduce economic struggle and debt in largely  
 
underdeveloped countries, their long-term effects were not conducive to overall  
 
development and often left citizens heavily impoverished because of the elimination of  
 
much needed government assistance and support. However, SAPs in primarily  
 
authoritarian countries, such as Ghana at this time, as discussed below, did little to  
 
combat corruption and poverty: “In political terms, it has been demonstrated that SAPs  
 
were predicated on authoritarian governments. The WB [World Bank] and the IMF  
 
comfortably negotiated SAPs with many such governments for years and the good  
 
governance conditionalities instituted in the late 1980s did not amount to support for  
 
democracy” (Tsikata N/A). John Adedji articulates that the adoption of economic  
 
restructuring programs in the 1980s facilitated a greater divide between the small elite  
 
and the overwhelming impoverished majority. Structural adjustment can have a very  
 
different impact on the different socio-economic classes of society, especially when  
 
implemented in authoritarian regimes in which citizens’ demands for assistance and  
 
equality may be more easily suppressed (Adedji 2001; Bangura 1992; Mustapha 1992).  
 
Furthermore, Meltem Şener elaborates on this in arguing that structural adjustment  
 
programs are usually implemented “…in undemocratic environments and also foster  
 
repression and undemocratic practices once they are applied…reforms within the context  
 
of structural adjustment programs that were applied in many African countries would be  
 
very hard to implement in a democratic environment” (2004, 6).  
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 As the sections below show, the ERP was no exception to this finding. However,  
 
as Samuel Gayi argues efforts could and should have been initiated to lessen the social  
 
costs of SAPs, in Ghana’s case the ERP. Including pro-poor and poverty alleviating  
 
policies within the ERP could have helped combat this hardship. Nevertheless, with little  
 
accountability to the populace, Ghana’s authoritarian regime did not address poverty  
 
concerns in implementing the ERP (Gayi 1995).  
 
 
 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP was a three-part program established out  
 
of Rawlings’ belief that, if society worked together to mass produce exports, efforts to  
 
improve the economy would be of little cost to the government and the state would  
 
drastically improve its domestic economy. He believed that, as a result, Ghana would  
 
emerge as an inspiration among African states and the global community. The first phase  
 
of the ERP focused on reducing the state’s burden of the failing economy and  
 
implementing subsequent economic reform methods (Ahiakpor 1991). Largely, the  
 
federal government relied on the people to contribute all they could to improve the  
 
economy. Primarily, this program reduced government expenditures and worked to  
 
drastically increase private production and tax collection. Rawlings also drastically  
 
reduced the value of the cedi, Ghana’s currency, so that within months, Ghana’s cedi had  
 
been devalued by 1,090 percent (Library of Congress 1995). This made Ghana’s exports  
 
cheaper for purchasing nations, raising Ghana’s GDP. In regards to improving Ghana’s  
 
place within the global economy, the ERP and Rawlings’ efforts to rapidly transform the  
 
economy were largely successful. As explained by Egor Kraev, Ghana’s annual GDP  
 
growth grew from roughly minus one percent in 1980 to roughly five percent by 1989  
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(2004).  
 
 
 
How the ERP could and should have Improved Food Security. At first glance, the ERP  
 
appeared to provide more benefits than costs; however, the main focuses of the ERP  
 
show that this program aimed to improve the strength of the economy and the state, not  
 
necessarily the lives of the state’s citizens (Ibhawoh 1999). Furthermore, improvement to  
 
the economy does not automatically translate to improvement in the standard of living,  
 
health, and food security. As the concept of human development highlights, “people are  
 
the real wealth of a nation…human development is concerned with…advancing the  
 
richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings  
 
live” (United Nations Development Program 2013). Applying this concept to the study of  
 
Ghana, human development in the form of health and food security is entirely dependent  
 
on the nation’s commitment to food governance and the equal distribution of economic  
 
benefits to all of society (Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). Therefore, the key to  
 
food security is not held within the economy itself. Rather, it is held within the hands of  
 
the government, which holds the power to either equally distribute or not equally  
 
distribute the benefits of this economy.  
 
 As a result, there are specific preconditions for the economy to positively improve  
 
food security levels. According to the FAO, those who are poor and subject to  
 
malnutrition can only benefit from economic growth if this growth is directly invested in  
 
and accessible to the poor. Most applicable to the history of Ghana’s economic  
 
transformation, for the economy to progress the nation’s food security status, Rawlings  
 
and the government as a whole would have had to increase work and income  
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opportunities for the poor and malnourished so that these individuals could afford  
 
adequate food and health resources. Government should also apply a sufficient  
 
portion of its new, increased revenue to establishing nationwide, reliable and stable  
 
“protection systems/safety nets” that focus on food and nutrition, tackling hunger, and  
 
health and wellbeing more generally.  
 
 Furthermore, government should also invest in increasing job opportunities and 
prospects for individuals that are in the state’s greatest revenue-building sector. In 
Ghana’s case, as is the case in many underdeveloped countries, this sector is agriculture. 
The significance of this is that the vast majority workers within this sector live rurally 
and are poor and undereducated. This is the most underprivileged and marginalized 
population. For this population to benefit from economic growth, the government would 
need to focus more of its revenue on improving the quantity and quality of goods and 
services accessible to this population. As the FAO explains, together these preconditions 
are part of the largest prerequisite of how economic growth can increase food security: 
good governance. Reverting back to chapter two’s discussion of the democratic 
mechanisms that improve food security, good governance constitutes the following: 
political stability and government effectiveness, and political participation and 
government accountability and proficiency. Most often, good governance is prioritized 
within democracies and is necessary for the economy to be a successful tool for reducing 
hunger and malnutrition  (Food and Agriculture Organization 2012).   
 
 
Social Costs and Consequences. For Ghana during the 1980s authoritarian regime, these  
 
preconditions were never present and, because of this, scholars do not see food security  
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improvements as a product of the 1980s economic growth. Rather, as expanded upon  
 
below, food insecurity grew. While scholarship written in the late 1980s points to the  
 
many ways in which the ERP should and could have benefited the general population’s  
 
standard of living, the reality of how the program was implemented tells a very different  
 
story. As Kwame Asiedu-Saforo states in his article entitled “Economic Reform  
 
Programmes and Agricultural Development,” the ERP originally asserted that it would  
 
focus on  
encouraging and sustaining growth and development in both food and 
cash crop sectors  to reverse low productivity levels of labour and 
land…these objectives include: improved input delivery, price 
incentives, better marketing and storage opportunities, transmission of 
proven technologies and other extension activities…and a general 
improvement of support services to the sector. (1989, 362) 
 
In its infancy, Rawlings, the PNDC, and the ERP promised that this economic reform  
 
would benefit all, a promise that was not kept. With the government focusing on  
 
addressing national economic issues and with no electorate to hold Rawlings accountable  
 
for neglecting the needs of the populace, the 1980s recovery efforts actually  
 
disadvantaged average citizens (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1988; Haynes 1991; Adedeji  
 
2001). For example, the vast majority of Ghanaians who worked to increase production  
 
for exports, what Rawlings proclaimed would be Ghana’s saving grace, did not  
 
personally benefit from the ERP.  
 
 The struggle of farmers best portrays the extent to which citizens worked to  
advance the ERP and Ghana’s economy but saw little if anything in return. In the 1980s, 
farmers made up over fifty percent of Ghana’s workforce and served as the support 
structure and work mules of the ERP and Rawlings’ plan to drastically increase exports 
(Baah-Boateng 2004). While farmers’ contributions to economic reform were 
unparalleled elsewhere in society, they were the most taken advantage of and 
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economically and physically distressed. From 1987 to 1988, 43 percent of “export 
farmers” were considered to be “very poor” and from 1988 to 1989, this figure increased  
to 44 percent. Similarly, from 1987 to 1988, 46 percent of food-for-consumption farmers  
were very poor, with this number rising to 53 percent from 1988 to 1989. These 
percentages exceeded percentages of all other work sectors during these years (Ghana 
Statistical Service 1995). In demanding higher agricultural yields and exports, Rawlings 
cut funds to farmers and to the agriculture sector in order to lessen the economic burden 
on the state. Shifting the responsibility of supporting and preserving the agriculture 
industry onto the farmers, in 1991 Rawlings replaced the existing Ghana Federation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives (GFAC), which was federally supported, with the Ghana 
National Association of Farmers (GNAF), which rescinded the government’s obligation 
to the agriculture sector and its laborers. In establishing the GNAF, Rawlings required 
that farmers take full responsibility for and wholly fund the GHAF, a “cooperative 
venture at the district, regional, and national levels” (Library of Congress 1995). 
Criticism of the ERP was common among farmers as they felt the growing stress of a 
dwindling agriculture budget in a decade already overwhelmed with unprecedentedly 
high poverty and hunger rates: “Farmers suffered as the percentage of the total budget 
devoted to agriculture fell from 10 percent in 1983 to 4.2 percent in 1986 and to 3.5 
percent in 1988, excluding foreign aid projects” (Library of Congress 1995). The ERP’s 
policy implementation also led to an unstable agriculture sector with wavering production 
rates (Codjoe 2007).  
 While farmers were the most disadvantaged, the rest of the populace experienced  
 
similar ramifications as a result of the ERP. For example, as the U.S. House of  
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Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs describes in “Structural Adjustment in  
 
Africa: Insights from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal,” Ghana’s structural  
 
adjustment policies  
 
failed to deal with the key constraints to equitable development…[and] 
to confront such important food production problems as: inadequate 
supply and extension of productive  technologies, weak credit systems 
and insufficient overall credit, lack of storage and effective price 
stabilization…the special problems of women…and an absence of local 
and regional market development. (1988, 9) 
 
The primary weakness of Rawlings’ authoritarian administration was its complete  
 
disregard for these social struggles associated with Ghana’s compromised economy and  
 
the policies that were implemented to improve it (Asiedu-Saforo 1989). Ghana’s  
 
development then was largely one-sided, with much economic progress but nearly no  
 
social progress. At the time, the greatest weakness of the economy was the disregard for  
 
human capital and the necessity of investing in citizens of all skill sets for the betterment  
 
of citizens’ lives and the nation’s progress:  
 
…success…depends on a well functioning and flexible labour market 
in which labour allocation is done through the market mechanism and 
also creates sufficient incentives for human capital 
investment…Critics…argue that the economic reform measures have 
failed to create jobs for the increasing labour force and alleviate 
poverty because the measures focused mainly on promoting price 
stability rather than addressing the underlying weakness of the 
economy… the initial phase of Ghana’s reform paid very little attention 
to the social dimensions of the programs. The immediate implications 
of the reform measures for employment and poverty were not explicitly 
incorporated into the policy formulation and implementation. (Baah-
Boateng 2004, 4) 
 
The government needed to but did not create policies to tackle these social issues, leaving  
 
its people susceptible to continuously increasing poverty and malnutrition rates.  
 
Regarding poverty levels, a large factor in whether or not a citizen can afford food,  
 
roughly 56 percent of the general population was considered “poor” from 1987 to 1988  
 
and 60 percent were poor between 1988 and 1989 (Ghana Statistical Service 1995).  
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Poverty levels across regions show that the majority of Ghana’s poor lived in rural areas.  
 
For instance, in the rural-savannah, the percentage of poor residents increased from 66  
 
percent between 1987 and 1988 to 74 percent between 1988 and 1989. These were the  
 
highest percentages across all other regions with the next highest percentages being in  
 
other rural regions (rural-forest and rural-coastal). Accra, the largest urban region, had  
 
the lowest percentage of poor residents. Rural residents had the highest poverty rates  
 
overall, many of these residents being farmers (Ghana Statistical Service 1995). As noted  
 
by Mohammed Awal, “…the challenge of achieving sustained, accelerated growth and  
 
poverty reduction still remained. Ghana…will need to grow faster: the kind which will  
 
enable broad base investments in human development and poverty alleviation” (2012).  
 
 In the 1980s, one of the only government efforts to address hunger rates was its 
acceptance of food aid. The 1980s marked the decade in which Ghana was most reliant 
on food aid, to such an extent that food aid vastly exceeded self-sufficiency. For instance, 
from 1982 to 1983, Ghana imported 46,000 tons of food aid. Between 1983 and 1984, 
food aid increased to 91,000 tons, more than doubling the amount of food aid it had 
received less than a year before (Library of Congress 1995). However, contrary to its 
purpose, food aid did not lessen malnutrition rates and as data presented below shows, by 
the end of Rawlings’ authoritarian rule, hunger rates were alarming. Food aid in alone 
was not enough to improve Ghana’s food insecurity levels. Also, with a government that 
persistently emphasized the need to increase production for export, self-sufficiency (a 
necessity of development) was simply not feasible for Ghana because farmers could 
devote neither time nor resources to growing crops for consumption. During this time  
period, Ghana mass-produced cassava, maize, plantain, rice, sorghum, millet, and yam.  
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Of these crops, Ghana was only self-sufficient in producing plantain. All other crops 
were produced for export purposes yet simultaneously imported as part of the state’s food 
aid plan (Codjoe 2007; Library of Congress 1995). Accordingly, “food supply per person 
dropped almost 30%” (Codjoe 2007).  
 As a result of the lack of government support and contribution to the public sector  
 
and the populace’s social struggles, the ERP also triggered significant declines in  
 
government programs dedicated to employment, health, and education. For instance,  
 
spending on social programs, including health, education, and welfare, 
declined drastically to between 4.7 and 5 percent. As a percentage of 
GDP, expenditures on health care fell from 1.2 percent in 1970 to 0.26 
percent in 1980-83; during the same period,  spending on education 
dropped from 3.9 percent to 0.85 percent. (Library of Congress 1995)   
 
This left many individuals un/underemployed, impoverished, malnourished, and  
 
undereducated. Directly impacting food security and general health, plummeting  
 
employment opportunities and rates left Ghanaian doctors and nutritionists with no other  
 
option but to flee from Ghana to countries that provided better business opportunities.  
 
Showing signs of “brain drain,” Ghana’s health care professionals swarmed to Saudi  
 
Arabia in droves. In the 1980s, the number of Ghanaian physicians working in Saudi  
 
Arabia exceeded the number of those still working in Accra, Ghana’s capital and most  
 
populated city (Sowa 2002). According to data compiled by the African Renaissance  
 
Ambassador Corporation (ARA Corp.), in the 1980s, roughly 60 percent of Ghana’s  
 
doctors emigrated (ARA Corp. n.d.).  
 
 Similarly, with practically no government assistance allocated to education and  
 
the growing dropout rates that resulted from students leaving school to try to earn a living  
 
for themselves and their families, corresponding teacher unemployment numbers spiked.  
 
Similar to the fleeing of doctors, there was an outpour of educators to states that had  
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stable education systems. As Nii Kwaku Sowa explains, Nigeria accepted and benefited  
 
from waves of Ghanaian teachers who moved to Nigeria because its booming oil reserves  
 
fostered government, financial support of education and led to thriving schools. In turn,  
 
with few teachers remaining in Ghana, students who remained in school received a  
 
deficient education that left them unprepared for the ominous job market (2002).   
 
 With equally diminishing employment rates across all other work sectors, the  
 
majority of Ghanaians were forced to either work multiple jobs or resort to criminal  
 
behavior as a survival strategy (Herbst 1993, 31). However, neither strategy increased 
average income rates enough that citizens could afford health care and nutritious foods. 
Even among those with stable employment, access to these necessities was severely 
limited by simultaneous decreases in pay and increases in the price of goods and services. 
Even for those who were employed, “serious distortions in the pricing system with 
inflation mounting to 3-digits as a result of administrative controls over prices and 
exchange rates caused a drastic decline in real wage such that in 1983, the wage index 
was only 33% of what it was in 1977 or 67% of its level in 1960” (Baah-Boateng 2004, 
12). In all, Ghana’s authoritarian years were fraught with growing un/under employment 
rates, a decrease in average wage, and the devaluation of the cedi, which led to increased 
consumer prices and the growing inability of citizens to afford consumer goods. In 1988, 
consumer prices were on average four times higher than in 1985 (Library of Congress 
1995). Furthermore, the FAO’s Domestic Food Price Level Index shows that Ghana’s  
food price level steadily increased from 2.99 in 1991 to 3.16 in 1995. However, in 1996,  
with three years of democracy underway, this decreased to 2.92 and continued to fall 
significantly over time (Food and Agriculture Organization 2013a). Index scores of later 
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years are elaborated on in the sections below.  
 Existing data concerning Ghana’s hunger and malnutrition rates in the 1980s and  
 
early 1990s shows that, when combined, the abovementioned consequences of Rawlings’  
 
authoritarian rule and the ERP created a significant ramification for the majority of  
 
society: severe food insecurity. This data shows the mass and prolonged presence of food  
 
insecurity throughout varying work sectors, geographic regions, and the entire country.  
 
First, as specified in chapter three above, the GHI for the year 1990 was taken from  
 
averaging data from the years 1988 to 1992, all of which are pre-democratization years  
 
besides 1992, the year of Ghana’s democratization and first democratic election. Because  
 
the effects of converting from authoritarianism to democracy are not immediate, the 1990  
 
GHI score is a true representation of Ghana’s hunger levels in the years leading up to  
 
democracy. In 1990, the GHI score was 21.4 compared to 16.3 (serious hunger), only six  
 
years later. In 1990, Ghana’s 21.4 hunger level was considered alarming, the IFPRI’s  
 
second-most severe hunger classification.  
 
 Data of the percent of malnutrition prevalence over time shows that in 1988  
 
roughly 30 percent of Ghana’s population was underweight. Similarly, the percentage of  
 
undernourished citizens was 34 percent in 1991 (Wiggins and Leturque. 2011). Both of  
 
these years and their percentages predate democracy. Substantial decreases in these  
 
percentages would not occur until 1996, only four years after democratization.  
 
Improvements to percentages of both “underweight” and “malnutrition” are discussed in  
 
detail in the sections below. In addition to these primary findings, other indicators of  
 
Ghana’s high food insecurity levels are Ghana’s per capita Dietary Energy Supply (DES)  
 
requirement deficiency and low per capita daily caloric intake. As explained in chapter  
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three, the per capita DES requirement is 2,118 calories. At the start of Rawlings’  
 
authoritarian rule (1982), the per capita caloric intake was 1,600. While this figure started  
 
to increase shortly after, it was short-lived and in 1990 sat at 1,800, only 200 calories  
 
above its 1982 standing. However, from 1994 to 1996, only a few years after  
 
democratization, Ghana would reach and begin to vastly exceed the DES requirement for  
 
the first time in decades (Emmanuel Aggrey-Fynn et al. 2006). As explained below, this  
 
was one of many food security and health benefits to emerge out of democratization.  
 
Post-democratization figures showing the changes in Domestic Food Price Level Index,  
 
GHI, the percentage of malnutrition and underweight, and DES are provided in the case  
 
study findings below.  
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: THE 1990s AND BEYOND – GHANA’S 
UNPRECEDENTED IMPROVEMENTS RESULTING FROM DEMOCRACY 
 
  
 With the food security concerns of previous decades still looming, the 1992  
 
elections and democratization marked a time of anticipation about Ghana’s potential for  
 
development. As Mohammed Awal best explains,  
   
…Ghana’s transition to democracy was for many, a reaction at some 
level, to the emerging challenges of the ERP/SAP (Abrahamsen, 2000; 
Hutchful, 2002; Ninsin, 2007). A democratic framework, it is thought, 
will create not only a new platform for the emergence of a popular, 
legitimate, and responsible constituency for continued economic reform 
(Whitfield, 2009a); but it will also, it is thought, establish and deepen a 
new democratic governance framework for achieving sustainable 
development (World Bank, 1989). (Awal 2012, 97) 
 
With democracy at the forefront, Ghana ushered in an era heavily focused on addressing  
 
the needs and struggles of society: most notably in this case, food insecurity. Whether  
 
implementing efforts to improve food security specifically or implementing efforts and  
 
policies that unintentionally impacted food security, Ghana’s democracy has fostered an  
 
unequivocally more food secure environment than the nation’s previous non- 
 
democracies.  
 
 
  
Differences in the Ideologies of Political Parties and Presidents 
  
 Variances in the ways food security issues have been addressed have been largely  
 
subject to the ruling party’s agenda. In reading this chapter, it should be kept in mind then  
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that during each presidency the ideologies of the governing political party and the  
 
president himself have largely shaped what health and food security initiatives have been  
 
implemented. Differences in the NDC’s 2012 Manifesto and the NPP’s 2012 Manifesto  
 
depict this. Within Ghana, the NDC is the more liberal party and the NPP is the more  
 
conservative party of these two leading, opposing political parties. The NDC has  
 
remained heavily committed to addressing the following issue areas: improving  
 
education, health rates, and poverty rates, agricultural modernization, expanding  
 
infrastructure, and ensuring a transparent and accountable governance. The NPP’s agenda  
 
is rooted in economic transformation, providing basic amenities and supporting job  
 
creation, safety, promoting enterprise, and keeping Ghana on the global map. Since  
 
democratizing, Ghana has primarily been governed by presidents of NDC origin.  
 
Rawlings was the first NDC president, in office from 1993 to 2001. The 2001 election  
 
and inauguration of John Kufuor ushered in an eight-year NPP presidency. In 2009, John  
 
Atta Mills (NDC) took office, but he died on July 24, 2012 during his third year as  
 
President. John Dramani Mahama, the Vice President of Ghana at the time, was  
 
inaugurated that same day and is the incumbent President of Ghana, representing the third  
 
NDC presidency since 1992. While each president has had his own agenda, as discussed  
 
below, the NDC and the NPP have quite similar political ideologies and goals and have  
 
largely implemented similar agendas. As explained in “Change for a Better Ghana,” “the  
 
NDC and NPP are not sharply differentiated along ideological lines. There is a gap  
 
between the ideological images constructed by the parties and the actual policies pursued  
 
by those parties when in government…the policies pronounced and pursued by the NPP  
 
and NDC governments since the 1990s have not been that different” (Whitfield 2009,  
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630).  
 
 In the years of NPP presidency, Kufuor and the NPP party introduced efforts and  
 
policies to improve the economy, agricultural industry, and hunger levels at the national  
 
level, local level, and for the wellbeing of individuals’ economic status (Foster 2011). In  
 
Kufuor’s publication “Ghana’s Transformation,” he explains his ideological approach  
 
during his presidency:  
 
My administration aimed to ensure a more efficient and productive 
agricultural base that would become the engine of the economy by 
providing food security, ushering in industrialization, creating jobs, and 
increasing export revenues. The critical need was—and is—for an 
agricultural transformation. (Kufuor 2011) 
 
Out of this, from 2001 to 2008, the GOG’s most significant policy implementations and  
 
programs were the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) of 2003 and GPRS II  
 
(2006), legislation to increase health care professionals’ salaries and benefits (2004), and  
 
the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) of 2002 and FASDEP II  
 
(2007). Each are discussed in depth below.  
 
 While each president from NDC origin (Rawlings, Mills, and Mahama) has had  
 
his own political ideologies and plans to progress Ghana’s development, collectively  
 
these presidents’ food security principles have been very similar and have expanded upon  
 
each others’ previous emphases. Together, they have focused attention on citizens’  
 
political and voting rights, general health, infrastructure advancements, agriculture  
 
industry advancements, the government’s relationship with CSOs, and improving food  
 
security levels. However, each president has prioritized and addressed certain issue areas  
 
more so than others.  
 
 Starting with Rawlings’ presidency from 1993 to 2001, Rawlings was most  
 
concerned with good governance, citizens’ health and wellbeing, and agricultural  
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development. In “The Legacy of J.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics, 1979-2000,” John  
 
Adedeji presents Rawlings’ priorities. He states that Rawlings’ greatest efforts were  
 
“focused on the exploited and poor in Ghana, and his revolutionary ‘power to the  
 
people’” ideology (Adedeji 2001). He also focused on “rebuilding Ghana’s crumbling  
 
infrastructures including roads, hospitals, and electricity…” (Adedeji 2001). Throughout  
 
his two-term presidency, Rawlings and his administration created Ghana Health Services  
 
(1996), the Water Resource Center (1996), the Community Water and Sanitation Agency  
 
(1998), the Serious Fraud Office (1998), and passed the Citizenship Act (2000).  
 
 President Mills, although only in office for less than a complete term, has been  
 
largely credited with having a political ideology and plan of action heavily devoted to  
 
good governance, human rights, economic development, and improving the health and  
 
wellbeing of Ghanaians and citizens of all other African countries (World Profile Group  
 
2013). After his passing, United States President Barack Obama praised Mills for his  
 
dedication to human rights efforts for all Ghanaian citizens (BBC News 2012).  
 
Furthermore, according to the World Profile Group’s publication of “Ghana:  
 
Accelerating Africa’s Revival,”  
 
Atta Mills is credited with reducing Ghana’s inflation to single digits, 
maintaining macro-economic stability, and avoiding hikes in food 
prices, applying good governance in the public sector, and conducting a 
transparent and educated development of the natural resources sector. 
His vision…included stimulating agriculture and industry with oil 
revenues, accelerating infrastructure developments, and creating jobs 
through improved social services such as health, education, and utility 
provision, especially energy and water. (World Profile Group 2013, 2) 
 
Out of Mills’ vision and goals for Ghana, he and his administration implemented the  
 
Breadbasket Initiative (2010), the Ghana Agricultural Insurance Programme (2011), and  
 
a 2012 GOG budget heavily focused on increasing infrastructure spending for roads,  
 
highways, and transportation issues.   
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 President Mahama’s ideology has been on point with Mills’ previous plans. In his  
 
2014 State of the Nation Address, Mahama proclaimed his commitment to expanding and  
 
improving good governance, the agriculture industry, food security, self-sufficiency, and  
 
building working relationships with CSOs (Parliament of Ghana 2014). While many of  
 
Mahama’s ideologies, efforts, and plans for Ghana’s future are largely in line with that of  
 
previous NDC presidents, he has placed a greater emphasis than his predecessors on  
 
strengthening the GOG’s relationship with CSOs. One of the greatest examples of this  
 
administration’s improved relationship with CSOs has been the GOG’s support of and  
 
involvement with agriculture and food security CSOs such as the Ghana Coalition of  
 
Civil Society for Scaling Up Nutrition (2013).  
 
 To best highlight all of the food security initiatives and advancements that have  
 
occurred in the name of democracy, the remainder of this chapter is broken down into  
 
two main sections to first portray how the main mechanisms of democracy, as discussed  
 
in the literature review, have developed in Ghana. These sections are Political Stability  
 
and Government Effectiveness and Political Participation and Government  
 
Accountability and Proficiency. Most importantly, within both of these sections, an  
 
analysis is given as to how these developments have positively impacted food security  
 
specifically. Finally, to show the extent that food security ratings have increased during  
 
Ghana’s two decades of democracy, the study revisits the indicators analyzed above, the  
 
Domestic Food Price Level Index, GHI, malnutrition and underweight percentages, and  
 
DES. 
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Political Stability and Government Effectiveness 
  
 In looking back at Kwame Nkrumah’s pre-independence promise that, if Ghana  
could achieve self-government, the country would become a paradise within ten years, it 
seems that Ghana’s official democratization in 1992 was long past due in the hearts and 
minds of Ghanaians. However, the ways that democracy has been successful in bettering 
the lives of the populace show that while Ghana may not be a “paradise,” Nkrumah was 
not incorrect in believing that self-government (democracy) would have a positive impact 
on the nation. Undoubtedly, democracy in Ghana today is still fragile; however, political 
stability is progressing and is unparalleled by any other time in Ghana’s history. This has 
allowed the general public to shed light on and hold government accountable in ways it 
never could or had before (Merz 2011). The following subcategories show the many 
ways in which this finding has proven to be true amongst Ghana’s political and governing 
systems since 1992.   
       
The Political Party System and the Political Environment 
 
 Regarding Huntington’s standards of political stability, Ghana has since  
 
democratizing been very successful in institutionalizing. While Huntington argued that  
 
democratizing before institutionalizing political parties can be dangerous and can create  
 
political instability in many Third World countries, Ghana’s experience seems to be a  
 
case that contradicts this argument. Lindsay Whitfield argues that within Ghana,  
 
institutionalization emerged out of the Fourth Republic, simultaneously with  
 
democratization. She states that, “in the Fourth Republic, power is not consolidated in  
 
individuals but rather through the idea of the party and the party machinery…parties were  
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not really institutionalized before…[during] authoritarianism and bouts of military rule,  
 
parties only emerged for short periods of time before being disbanded again” (2009, 640).  
 
Ghana’s institutionalization went hand in hand with its democratization, leading to  
 
regularity, stable roots, legitimacy, and an organized political party system (Osei 2012).  
 
Perhaps what makes Ghana’s political system successful is its two-party system  
 
consisting of parties that are rooted in political and social ideals and not the political  
 
itinerary of one political elite, and its strong political party support and involvement of  
 
citizens (Osei 2012). As Whitfield best articulates,  
 
…Ghana is different from several African countries where parties split 
or form around leaders, who bring their popular support base with 
them. It is also different in that elections are not dominated by ethnic 
politicization, because the two main parties in Ghana have a strong 
political  support base in most regions and party identification is based 
on cross-cutting social cleavages of which ethnicity forms only one 
part. (2009, 621) 
 
As a result, Ghana’s political party system is characterized as being a “stable party”  
 
system (Lindberg 2007).   
 
 Since democratizing, Ghana’s political environment has transformed drastically  
 
and rapidly. Political leaders and citizens have progressively begun to accept and abide  
 
by the democratic standard of requiring a nonviolent and stable political environment in  
 
which all people are able to fearlessly participate. As expected, in shifting from a long- 
 
standing history of authoritarian rule in which authoritarian regimes’ opinions and  
 
decisions were end-all be-all, citizens were not quick to criticize or make demands of  
 
government. Therefore, until the mid- to late-1990s, citizens were skeptical about what  
 
part they would now play in the political arena and governance. As a result, confidence in  
 
democracy and Ghana’s classification as a democracy was not initially wholly felt.  
 
Proving that citizens’ trust increased significantly over time, Afrobarometer, “an  
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African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance in  
 
Africa,” provides survey data regarding citizens’ opinions about Ghana’s developing  
 
democracy (Afrobarometer 2012a). According to “Popular Attitudes Toward Democracy  
 
in Ghana: A Summary of Afrobarometer Indicators, 1999-2008,” since 1999,  
 
“satisfaction with democracy has risen more than 25 percent since 1999” (Afrobarometer  
 
2009, 1). Furthermore, the percentage of citizens surveyed that labels Ghana as either a  
 
full-fledged democracy or a democracy with minor problems has risen from 69 percent in  
 
1999 to 83 percent in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2009). As an outside, impartial organization,  
 
Freedom House supports these findings in assessing that Ghana has since democratizing  
 
grown from being “partially free” to “free” (Freedom House 2013). “Table 1. Freedom in  
 
Ghana” presents this data, showing freedom levels for every other year since 1990  
 
(Freedom House 2014). 
 
          Table 1. Freedom in Ghana 
 Country Status Civil Liberties  
Rating / 7 
Political Rights 
Rating / 7 
1990 NF 5 6 
1992 PF 5 5 
1994 PF 4 5 
1996 PF 4 3 
1998 PF 3 3 
2000 
2002 
PF 
F 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2004 F 2 2 
2006 F 2 1 
2008 F 2 1 
2010 F 2 1 
2012 F 2 1 
 *Note: NF – Not Free; PF – Partly Free; F – Free  
 Until 2003, combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties:  
 1.0-2.5 = Free; 3.0-5.5 = Partly Free; 5.5-7.0 = Not Free. 
 2003 and beyond, combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties:  
 3.0-5.0 = Partly Free; 5.5-7.0 = Not Free. (Freedom House 2014).  
 The lower the score, the freer   
 
 What these statistics show and their pertinence to the political environment of  
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democracy in Ghana are based on the non-violent, open quality of the political system 
 
and the comfort, safety, equality, and freedoms that citizens believe in and rely on within 
this system. According to surveys conducted in 1999, 2005, and 2008 in accordance with 
the above article, when asked how political leaders should be selected, between 86 and 90 
percent of respondents proclaimed that leaders should be selected via “regular, open, and 
honest elections” (Afrobarometer 2009, 5). Subsequently, when asked how free and fair 
the last election was, the percentage of respondents stating that elections were entirely 
free and fair or were free and fair with minor problems increased from 62 percent in 
1999, to 77 percent in 2005, and to 83 percent in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2009, 10). In all, 
the majority of the electorate believes that democratic elections are the most successful 
and fair means of choosing political leaders. While some elections may not run as 
smoothly as others, for instance, the 2008 national election discussed below, the electoral 
process is deemed by citizens and has proven to be healthier for Ghana than previous 
methods of authoritarian and military rule. This achievement has been one of Ghana’s 
greatest successes in improving its political stability and dedication to governing by and 
for the people. According to the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), “Since the 
restoration of civilian rule in 1993, Ghana’s most notable achievement has been the 
progressive improvement of electoral management and the increasing acceptance of 
election results as fair by participants and observers alike” (2007, 1). For Ghana, 
universal acceptance of elections as free and fair has been crucial to their overall 
development in two key aspects: 1) acceptance of elections shows that citizens believe 
that they can make a difference within the political system and make demands of 
government regarding their needs, and 2) acceptance of elections helps prevent citizens 
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from reverting to the use of political violence, which in turn offers an environment in 
which all citizens are safe and able to vote for political leaders and policies that benefit 
their health and well-being.   
 Ghana’s nonviolent political environment has also fostered higher citizen 
involvement and political participation rates (discussed in Political Participation and 
Government Accountability and Proficiency to follow). What makes modern Ghana 
drastically different from its authoritarian years and even from other African countries 
attempting to democratize is the country’s ability to refrain from reverting back to violent 
measures in order to make political change. Differently from citizens during the nation’s 
authoritarian years, Ghanaians today do not need to utilize violent tactics to get 
government attention. Furthermore, they recognize that in utilizing violent mechanisms, 
democracy suffers because if society does not collectively abide by democracy’s 
nonviolent requirements, democracy itself has no standing or power within society. This 
consequently would destroy democracy and potentially return Ghana to authoritarian 
rule, an outcome that has plagued many other African countries. Viewing this as a serious 
threat to the nation’s future, Ghanaians and political leaders alike have since 
democratizing accepted and worked diligently to prevent any and all violent, political 
uprisings (Ace Project 2009).  
 In “Government Accountability and Responsiveness: Evidence from 
Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey in Ghana,” 93 percent of Ghanaians surveyed said that 
they would never use political violence (Afrobarometer 2012b). Similarly, as George 
Ayittey discusses in “Opinion: What Ghana Can Teach the Rest of Africa about 
Democracy,” political leaders have taken a stance against non-violence and have largely 
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refrained from making accusatory statements when an election does not end in their favor 
(Ayittey 2012). This has set precedent among the electorate to encourage non-violent 
elections and to use nonviolent political participation as a tool to improve Ghana’s state 
as a developing country committed to improving citizen wellbeing. The greatest proof of 
Ghana’s success in this instance is its ranking as the second “most peaceful country in 
Africa” (Government of Ghana 2007).   
 Furthermore, while democracy has grown in Ghana, so have levels of political 
stability and absence of violence. For instance, findings of the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators show that between 1996 to 2012 Ghana’s political stability levels 
and absence of violence have progressively improved. Findings are presented on a scale 
of -2.5 (weak political stability and absence of violence) to 2.5 (strong political stability 
and absence of violence). In 1996, only four years after democratization, Ghana’s score 
sat at -0.32; however, by 2012, this score was 0.10 (The World Bank 2013). “Table 2. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence” displays Ghana’s progression over time. 
Because Ghana is a new democracy that is still adjusting to the use of nonviolent  
            Table 2. Political Stability and Absence  
            of Violence 
 Score Election Year? 
1996 -0.32 Yes 
1998 -0.24  
2000 -0.44 Yes 
2002 -0.24  
2004 0.01 Yes 
2006 
2008 
0.02 
-0.01 
 
Yes 
2010 0.02  
2012 0.10 Yes 
 
political participation, the levels of political stability and absence of violence have been  
lower during election years. However, the overall trend shows that Ghana has already  
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experienced great improvement and continues to undergo a slow, yet significant  
development in its levels of political stability as it grows as a democracy.  
 The best example of the nation’s progress with political violence and its impact 
on preserving democracy was the 2008 national elections, which ended with “a less than 
0.5% margin of victory in a highly politicized environment” (United Nations 
Development Program 2012). Proving to be Ghana’s closest election and biggest threat to 
democracy to date, the electoral environment slowly started to create disorder and chaos 
as society began to replicate previous habits of alleging that the election was fixed. Some 
citizens began threatening political violence. However, as Jarreth Merz explains, the 
citizenry as a whole united and abandoned their previous routine and desire to create a 
violent uproar and redirected their attention and efforts instead to proclaiming and 
proving that they wanted a peaceful election and transfer of power. With this solidarity 
and society’s commitment to the democratic political process, Ghanaians returned to the 
polls three times to recast their ballots before a clear winner was named (Merz 2011). Out 
of this event, the observer sees that, when tested, the strength of Ghana’s democracy and 
the people’s desire to retain democracy proved to be much stronger than their propensity 
to resort to political violence. Merz reiterates that out of this struggle, Ghanaians have 
largely come to accept and have proven to other African countries that violence is no 
longer a feasible tactic for making political change if democracy is to be achieved and 
maintained. Simply, the lesson learned is that within democracy, “you don’t have to 
rebel. You have the freedom to choose, and with that choice comes a responsibility” 
(CNN 2011). The Ibrahim Index of African Governance’s (IIAG) “safety and rule of 
law” indicators show the interrelated nature of safety (lack of violence) and the rule of 
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law within democracy. The IIAG measures safety and the rule of law based on the 
following combined subcategories: rule of law, accountability, personal safety, and 
national security. Findings demonstrate that when combined, safety and the rule of law 
have been consistently high during the last decade (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014). 
 
 
Government Effectiveness: Preventing Corruption and Abiding by the Rule  
of Law  
 
 As presented in the literature review, Wise and Sainsbury argue that, differently 
from that of non-democracies, within democracies “more potential actions are generated 
for consideration, there is better monitoring and control of government and government 
bureaucracies, decisions are more likely to reflect the wishes of the majority, and hence 
government decisions are more likely to be health promoting” (Wise and Sainsbury 2007, 
181). While this quotation is presented as a generalization about how democracy’s focus 
on government effectiveness, as defined and described in the literature review above, 
may positively impact citizens’ health rates, Ghana’s progress in government 
effectiveness shows that this is not only a generalized theory but also a reality in this 
specific case. The GOG has incorporated preventative measures to tackle and suppress 
corruption and has created legislation and sectors of government specifically responsible 
for ensuring that government officials and agents at all levels abide by the rule of law. In 
addition to taking measures to ensure that all citizens are equally held accountable to 
Ghanaian laws, the GOG has also devoted the last thirty years to working to equally 
distribute government attention and social services. When coupled, these advancements 
have drastically contributed to Ghana’s success in using government effectiveness to  
improve food security levels.  
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 Still skeptical about how committed government is to fighting corruption, roughly 
50 percent of Afrobarometer survey respondents believed that “some” elected officials—
whether or not they are in the office of the Presidency, members of Parliament, or 
government officials—were corrupt (Afrobarometer 2012b, 30). Even with this common 
conception of corruption within the GOG, it must be stressed that even though corruption 
has not and likely cannot be completely eliminated, since democratizing, the GOG has 
instituted many successful efforts to minimize it. With the establishment of the 1992 
Constitution, the GOG instituted the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ), which serves as not only a human rights institution but also as an 
agency that serves to prevent corruption so that human rights can be fully reached.  To 
this end, the commission investigates any and all reports of corruption. This allows 
everyday citizens to report experiences with, and to hold accountable, corrupt 
government officials. No individual is exempt from investigations of corruption. 
Furthermore, the CHRAJ will first tell individuals that are found guilty of corrupt acts 
that they have three months to make the necessary changes. After this point, the 
commission will take legal action via the court system (Access 2013). The most profound 
indicator of the CHRAJ’s success and effectiveness is exemplified in its 2010 reports of 
the corruption complaints and administrative justice complaints that it handled for that 
given year. As reports show, the commission investigated 38 cases in which governing 
officials were accused of corrupt acts. Additionally, the commission investigated 978 
allegations of administrative injustice. The most common allegations were “unlawful 
dismissal” of which there were 131 cases and “unlawful termination of appointment” of 
which there were 125 cases (Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
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2010). Herein we see that the CHRAJ is still honoring its promise and responsibility to 
investigate all claims of corruption that are brought before the committee.  
 Similarly, in 1998 Ghana established the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and in 2006 
passed the Whistleblower Act to encourage citizens to report more instances of 
corruption (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2006). In addition to passing the 
Whistleblower Act, the SFO has been effective in fighting fraud and corruption within 
Ghana because of its success in investigating significant corruption and fraud cases that if 
not investigated would have been detrimental to society and the federal government. As 
Sam K. Asibuo mentions, such cases include, but are not limited to, the following: 
Capital Telecom, Council of Indigenous Business Association, the State Enterprises, A 
Life Supermarket, Impregillo Group of Companies, and Sabat Motors Limited. The 
effectiveness of the SFO lies in the powers it has when conducting investigations. As 
explained by Alan Doig, David Watt, and Robert Williams, SFO officers have “police 
powers, the right of access to and seizure of documents, freezing of accounts, the right of 
prosecution (with approval of Attorney-General), the power to pay rewards, and the 
expectation of co-operation of, or powers of, other bodies as required in pursuit of its 
investigations” (2005). While there have been cases in the SFO’s history that the 
government did not take seriously or did not respond to in the way in which the SFO 
hoped for, the SFO has shined light upon and drawn public attention to many issues of 
corruption that would have otherwise remained in the shadows (see International  
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 2012, Ghana Web 1999, and Asibuo 2001).   
 Undoubtedly, corruption is still an issue of concern as it is within any state;  
however, in recent decades, Ghana has made unparalleled strides to ensure that 
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corruption does not return to its previous frequency. This is best exemplified by two 
separate cases of corruption within the national government and subsequent prosecution. 
In 2001, an NPP appointed minister of sports was charged, prosecuted, and found guilty 
of fraud (IDEG 2007b). In 2012, Alfred Agbesi Woyome, an avid supporter of the NDC 
political party, was charged with attempting to bribe governing officials. Three others 
were charged with “aiding and abetting a crime.” (Reuters 2012). While this may be 
perceived as a step backwards for the NDC party, the conviction of corrupt political 
figures is a step forward for the government and people of Ghana.  
 Even more impressively, Ghana’s pledge to follow the rule of law, as stipulated in 
the 1992 Constitution, has been one of its greatest democratic successes.  With the 
acceptance of democracy has come a distinct separation of powers. Most notably, the 
judicial branch has grown in power within the triad of federal branches and via the 
Constitution has been given the specific authority of “judicial independence.” The 
overwhelming power of the executive branch, a constant struggle of pre-democratization, 
has also been given much needed attention and revision. One of the greatest changes to 
the executive branch since the implementation of the 1992 Constitution is that it is now 
held strictly accountable for its actions and misconducts:  
Executive powers are subject to checks by Parliament, the judiciary, 
and to a limited extent the Council of State, an advisory body, as well 
as by constitutional oversight institutions such as CHRAJ. 
Disobedience of a decision of the Supreme Court on the 
constitutionality of any act is a crime, and a ground for removing the 
president or vice-president from office. (IDEG 2007b, 7) 
 
Existing data shows that the GOG now holds honoring the rule of law with utmost  
importance. According to the “Rule of Law Index, 2012-2013” prepared by members of 
the World Justice Project, Ghana ranks first in the region and twenty-ninth in the world in 
its protection of citizens’ fundamental rights. Ghana is also accredited for having an 
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effective system of checks and balances. Internationally, Ghana is ranked twenty-third 
and is regionally ranked second only to Botswana (Agrast, Mark David et al.  
2013).  
 
Using Government to Better the Lives of the Populace. By devoting itself to holding all  
 
individuals accountable to the law, Ghana is committed to impartiality and fairness  
 
within its growing democracy. In this case, honoring impartiality and fairness not only  
 
applies to holding all citizens responsible for their crimes but also gives government the  
 
obligation to work just as diligently to improve all citizens’ standards of living. As a  
 
result, the GOG has made the following efforts: focusing on reducing the nation’s  
 
poverty level and addressing the populace’s health care needs. First, as part of the  
 
nation’s growing focus on development and equality-based policy implementation, the  
 
GOG created the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) in 2003 and the GPRS II,  
 
an extension of the GPRS, in 2006. The main priority of both the GPRS I and II was to  
 
enhance livelihood and reduce poverty throughout all of Ghana via a government  
 
emphasis on social services distribution and good governance. Most applicable to health,  
 
GPRS I and II were largely successful in increasing the government budget allotted to  
 
increasing all citizens’ access to education, health care and organizations focused on  
 
improving health and wellbeing, safe water, and environmental health (Government of  
 
Ghana 2007). Because of GPRS I and II and other poverty-reduction strategies, the  
 
percentage of citizens living in poverty has progressively decreased over the last,  
 
roughly, 15 years:  
 
 
Ghana has managed to reduce poverty levels significantly by an annual 
average rate of 1.5% per year, from high of 51.7% in 1991/92 to 39.5% 
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in 1998/99 and then further to 28.5% in 2005/6 (GLSS 5). The 
accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction put the country en 
route to achieving the key poverty Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) well ahead of schedule. (Government of Ghana 2007, 24) 
 
 Another example of the energy that the GOG has put forth to improve citizen  
 
livelihood is the government’s recent focus on reducing “brain drain” among health care  
 
professionals. In 2004, the GOG initiated many incentives to help keep doctors, nurses,  
 
pharmacists, and other health specialists from emigrating. First, the GOG stepped in to  
 
ensure that all health care workers received better salaries, benefits, and general treatment  
 
within their fields. As James Antwi and David Phillips conclude in their study of the  
 
impact of wage reform in the public sector, increasing wages within the medical field has  
 
already opened the door to more and better health care providers within Ghana (2012).  
 
Secondly, the government introduced “paid study leave” and programs such as the  
 
College of Physicians and Surgeons to ensure that medical personnel educated in Ghana  
 
are also given post-graduate training within Ghana (Awumbila et al. 2008).  
 
 Even with these government initiatives, “brain drain” has lessened but is still a 
cause of concern within Ghana. However, in 2004, “health worker brain drain” was at 
one of the lowest points in the nation’s recent history (Awumbila et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, citizens today have already experienced more opportunities for better and 
more accessible health care. Also, with the increase of available health workers, the GOG 
has been able to increase the number and quality of health clinics in Ghana’s historically 
most deprived communities. The GOG has also prioritized maternal health care. To 
address the reality that pregnant women are among Ghana’s most vulnerable, the GOG 
instituted the National Delivery Exemption Policy which offers free delivery care for all 
pregnant women (Witter et al. 2009).   
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 Political Stability, Government Effectiveness and Food Security    
 
 The progress and growth of Ghana’s democracy, as detailed above, lay the  
foundation upon which many food security advancements have been made. In stepping  
away from its authoritarian tendency to prioritize the needs of the wealthy few over the  
needs of the masses, the GOG as a democracy has applied its values of honoring the 1992  
Constitution, the rule of law, equality, and representing the populace to improving its  
food security status. Most notably and applicable to the majority of the nation’s general  
population, the GOG has worked endlessly to improve hunger levels of the country’s  
most food insecure and disadvantaged: largely the working class and Ghana’s youth. In  
democratizing the GOG ushered in a citizen-centered approach to governing. Rather than  
using citizens (especially export farmers and other members of the working force) for the  
benefit of government, the GOG started using government to benefit the food security  
needs of citizens, a complete transformation from its pre-democracy days. As former  
President John Kufuor discussed in an interview with Elly Kaganzi of the FAO, “health,  
nutrition, social justice, infrastructure and better livelihoods all need to be addressed in  
order to achieve food security in any country. It requires government commitment  
coupled with support from the private sector, civil society and the populace…in ensuring  
eradication of food insecurity and poverty” (Kaganzi 2013). The GOG has publically  
acknowledged and displayed that it is committed to making these necessary efforts. 
 
Cultivating Improved Production Among Farmers. The way in which the GOG has aided  
 
and supported the nation’s farmers is one of the greatest displays of the GOG’s citizen- 
 
centered commitments and the impact that said commitments have had on Ghana’s food  
 
security levels. In the years leading up to democratization, the most food-insecure  
 
individuals were undoubtedly farmers, who for decades powered the country’s increase in  
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exports and economic growth but were themselves going hungry. During authoritarian  
 
rule then, farmers served as a pawn of the GOG who prioritized Ghana’s international  
 
image and economic growth over the needs and struggles of the people. Working to mend  
 
the government’s fragile relationship with farmers, the GOG has made necessary changes  
 
to its expectations of and aid to the farming industry. Working cooperatively with farmers  
 
and NGOs, the GOG has initiated many successful production and distribution-based  
 
programs. With this support, farmers—who now account for 56 percent of the labor  
 
force—have in turn been able to greatly expand upon the production of crops grown for  
 
internal sale and consumption, a key influence in the country’s declining hunger levels  
 
(United States Government 2013; Ghana Business News 2013a).   
 
 The GOG’s most successful agricultural production programs have been the  
 
Ghana Agricultural Insurance Programme (GAIP) and farmer education programs such as  
 
the Breadbasket Initiative and “The Role of Agriculture in Achieving Middle-Income  
 
Status” workshop. GAIP was established in 2011 as an initiative of the National  
 
Insurance Commission (NIC), a government-based commission effective under the  
 
Insurance Act, 2006 (Act 724), with the support of the German International Cooperation  
 
(GIZ) (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana 2011; National Insurance  
 
Commission 2009). Directly influencing the creation of GAIP, in 2010, economists and  
 
scholars Dean Karlan et al. conducted a pilot study and experiment in rural Ghana in  
 
which local farmers were surveyed about their perception of economic risk in the farming  
 
profession (Karlen et al. 2010; Karlen et al. N/A). Their findings show that in many  
 
instances, farmers neglected to apply for bank loans out of fear that extended,  
 
unfavorable weather would reduce their yields, income, and ability to make loan  
 
payments. Similarly, as discussed by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), farmers were  
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often hesitant to invest in new technologies and techniques for fear that they may fail:  
 
Underinvestment in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, hybrid seeds, 
or labor is thought to drive low crop yields in Africa and other parts of 
the developing world. Several factors may help explain why farmers 
fail to invest in such potentially profitable inputs. It is possible that they 
are wary of the riskiness of adopting new agricultural methods or 
tools—if they invest and their crops still fail, they will have even less 
money than if they had not invested at all. (2011) 
 
In these cases, risk, not an absence of capital, was often the main factor preventing  
 
farmers from adopting modern farming techniques (Innovations for Poverty Action  
 
2011).  
 
 As a result of these findings, Ghana instituted GAIP as its first crop insurance  
 
program. GAIP consists of nineteen insurance companies that provide varying types of  
 
risk management crop insurance for everything from small-scale farming to commercial  
 
farming (Ghana Agricultural Insurance Programme 2013). As the NIC Board of Directors  
 
Chairman Frederick Quaye Nortey explains, GAIP was founded in order to  
 
…improve access to agricultural and rural finance, smooth farmers’ 
income and improve food security in both the medium and long 
term…Through GAIP we…protect our farmers against risks associated 
with the negative effects of climate change…reduce vulnerability and 
thus reduce poverty. (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of 
Ghana 2011)  
The general process is as follows: farmers participating in GAIP pay one-tenth of  
 
their crop costs to GAIP at the start of each farming season.  If twelve successive days  
 
pass without rainfall, farmers are given an automatic payout to compensate for this  
 
disruption of yields. Specifically, GAIP analyzes data collected by government built and  
 
sponsored automatic weather stations (AWSs) which monitor temperature, rainfall,  
 
humidity, wind, and other weather changes that could inhibit yields (Oppong-Ansah  
 
2013). Since its origin two years ago, GAIP has made payments to roughly 140 insured  
 
farmers (Ghana News Agency 2012). The effectiveness of GAIP is best corroborated by  
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farmers’ personal experiences. For instance, when asked about his experience with GAIP,  
 
Alhaji Alhassan Gunda Zakaria, a large-scale farmer, explained that GAIP has not only  
 
helped him but has also been beneficial for the 3,000 smallholder farmers that he directs  
 
and supervises on a regular basis (Oppong-Ansah 2013). Similarly, smallholder farmer  
 
Suleman Mustapha Simbia stated the following: “I no longer think of losing my yield due  
 
to the low or high rainfall. My confidence and love for farming has grown. And this year,  
 
I have increased the number of acreages I cultivate from 1.2 to 2.4 hectares” (Oppong- 
 
Ansah 2013). Together, these personal experiences show that the effects of GAIP are  
 
evident in both top down and bottom up scenarios. While GAIP is a recent initiative and  
 
it is too soon to see how it has positively impacted the very expansive issue of food  
 
security, it has already proven to be an effective program at the ground level and shows  
 
great potential for changing the future of food security in Ghana. Arguably, with less  
 
production pressure on farmers’ shoulders, the farming industry as a whole is already  
 
able to plant more and new varieties of their standard crops, and to try new approaches  
 
and techniques to increase yields. If continued and expanded upon, this could have a very  
 
significant and positive impact on food security overall.  
  
 Via agricultural extension and advisory services, educating farmers on how best  
 
to improve their practice and quality and quantity of their yields has been a significant  
 
and crucial stride for the GOG and the country itself. The Breadbasket Initiative of 2010,  
 
a program implemented by the GOG’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) and  
 
supported by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), is an example of  
 
this development. The initiative is “aimed at doubling yields, increasing the food security  
 
and incomes of around 250,000 smallholder farmers, and creating 15,000 jobs in  
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agriculture-related sectors including agro-dealership, marketing, transport, and  
 
processing” (Karuga 2012). Historically, especially pertaining to smallholder farmers, 
 
staple foods such as maize were scatter-planted in a way that severely hindered the  
 
growth and yields of that plant. Until the MOFA and the AGRA started focusing on  
 
educating and training farmers to think and act strategically when planting, yields were  
 
quite poor. Currently, as part of the Breadbasket Initiative, farmers are educated about the  
 
importance of planting in straight lines and with appropriate spacing to maximize yield  
 
potential. The initiative has also introduced farmers to the benefits of manure, fertilizer,  
 
and compost. As part of their education, farmers are shown how to correctly use these  
 
tools to prevent over-fertilization and other negative consequences of improper use  
 
(Oppong-Ansah 2011). In a similar fashion, farmers are being taught simple yet effective  
 
methods of fighting and counteracting agricultural viruses, diseases, and insects (Gyamfi  
 
2006). With local, small-scale farmers as the prominent target, the initiative is an of-the- 
 
people platform that is greatly helping farmers adopt “best practice” approaches to their  
 
existing technique. Similar to GAIP, the Breadbasket Initiative is in its infancy and for  
 
this reason, it is difficult to measure how this program has influenced food security.  
 
However, the initiative is indicative of progress made to better small-scale farming meant  
 
for internal consumption. Over time this will likely perpetuate citizens’ access to  
 
nutritious foods, creating a healthier citizenry and therefore higher levels of food security  
 
overall.  
 
 Additional educational opportunities have been presented to the agriculture  
community via workshops that are held for farmer representatives, legislators, and  
agricultural experts across the globe with the purpose of working together to improve  
Ghana’s agricultural industry, farmers’ livelihoods, and improved food security for the  
96 
 
populace. An example is “The Role of Agriculture in Achieving Middle-Income  
Status,” a workshop held in Accra, Ghana, in 2007, to inform attendants of the next  
steps that the country needs to take in order to reach its food security goals. Working  
collectively, GOG officials, farming representatives, and international specialists, are  
educating farmers on their crucial role in improving food security. Also, officials are  
becoming more aware of how they can help farmers and the agricultural industry improve  
production rates and the quality and availability of that production to Ghana’s citizens  
(FANRPAN 2007; IFPRI 2007).  
 Other government-supported programs that have positively impacted crop  
production in Ghana are the Root and Tuber Improvement Programme (RTIP) of 1999 to  
2004 and the ensuing Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Programme (RTIMP)  
of 2007 and 2014. The RTIP and RTIMP have together successfully distributed new,  
more effective, varieties of staple crops to rural and often poor farmers as a means to  
increase those farmers’ yields, increase the farmers’ incomes as a result of those yields,  
and in turn increase the amount of staple foods made available to citizens. In evaluating  
how successful the RTIP has been, the International Fund for Agricultural Development  
(IFAD) has stated that 
[the] RTIP has been well-managed and successfully implemented with 
good results in most areas. Its greatest strength was in creating a well-
functioning nationwide system for multiplication and distribution of 
improved planting materials. In the process it strengthened numerous 
institutions, increased farmer access to information, improved 
production practices and contributed to better household food security. 
(2003) 
The RTIMP has since achieved similar successes and progressed beyond the RTIP  
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana 2013a).  
 
 Just as crucial to production as the quality of the crops themselves, Ghana’s  
 
irrigation systems had long needed revamping. Founded by the Ministry of Agriculture in  
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1977 and now managed and funded by the MOFA of the GOG, the Irrigation  
 
Development Authority (IDA) is responsible for investigating potential irrigation plans,  
 
managing these plans, and maintaining existing irrigation schemes. To date, this authority  
 
has initiated 22 of its own irrigation projects, totaling 6,505 hectares throughout the  
 
country. An additional 22 schemes are constructed under the Small Scale Irrigation  
 
Development Project (SSIDP) and six schemes are under the Small Farms Irrigation  
 
Project (SFIP). In all, the construction of these systems has been most advantageous for  
 
rural small-scale farmers; however, currently the IDA is working to more efficiently  
 
maintain the irrigation systems that it has developed, as some systems already require  
 
more upkeep than the IDA has been able to handle. This then is a remaining challenge of  
 
irrigation development in Ghana (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana  
 
2013b).  
 
 
Infrastructure Advancements: Roadways, Water Supply, and Sewage Disposal. While  
increasing the amount and quality of yields designated for internal use is crucial to  
generating food security, production is only one the of the many steps in delivering  
nutritious and safe foods to citizens. Following production, crops must be accessible.  
Furthermore, crops are inedible without safe water with which to clean and cook food. It  
is also crucial that citizens have safe water to drink and that human waste does not come  
into contact with water and in turn be digested. Government developments in these  
regards have very recently become a priority of the GOG and a crucial step in reducing  
hunger levels and food- and water-borne illnesses.  
 Effort to better infrastructure in the way of roadways is a relatively new effort of  
 
the GOG, as historically roadway development had been stagnant. Even as recently as  
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2011, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report argued that  
 
inadequate roadways was one of the most problematic issues to overcome in conducting  
 
business in Ghana (Oxford Business Group 2012). Equally, infrastructure has been a  
 
longstanding concern for farmers needing to take their products to market. Consequently,  
 
this has had repercussions for citizens’ accessibility. Furthermore, while roadway  
 
infrastructure is a new focus of the GOG and it may be too early to measure the degree to  
 
which changes have impacted food security, the GOG must be credited for its most recent  
 
focus on improving infrastructure as a means to improve human life: “The key theme of  
 
the 2012 budget… is infrastructure spending, with a particular focus on transport and  
 
energy. It encompasses agricultural, water, health and education facilities as well”  
 
(Oxford Business Group 2012). More specifically, the motto of the 2012 budget,  
 
“Infrastructural Development for Accelerated Growth and Job Creation,” reflects the  
 
GOG’s intentions to strengthen livelihood, reduce hunger and poverty, and improve  
 
general health (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: Republic of Ghana 2011).  
 
 While Ghana’s road systems far exceed the roadways of other low-income  
 
nations, improving and expanding upon existing roadways and constructing new  
 
roadways are priorities of the GOG in its efforts to raise Ghana to middle-income status  
 
(The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 2010).  
 
For instance, in 2012 the GOG allocated the highest budgets (of all its ministries) to  
 
the Ministry of Roads and Highways and the Ministry of Transport. The Ministry of  
 
Roads and Highways received a budget of GHS908 million, equivalent to $538.35  
 
million U.S. dollars (USD) and the Ministry of Transport received a budget of GHS99  
 
million, comparable to $58.69 million USD. In addition to increasing the budgets of these  
 
99 
 
ministries, the GOG has instituted a program referred to as the “Gang of Six,” a project to  
 
complete six major highways that span throughout the nation (Ministry of Finance and  
 
Economic Planning: Republic of Ghana 2011). As reported by the Ministry of Roads and  
 
Highways in 2013, the Gang of Six’s 2012 budget and 2013 budget, of GHS 3.96  
 
million,will fall short of what would be needed to complete all six highways. However,  
 
it is projected that three highways will be completed this year, arguably a step in the right  
 
direction for an infrastructure sector that fell by the wayside for years (Ghana Web 2013).    
 
 Since democratizing, the GOG has progressed considerably in providing citizens  
 
with access to proper sewage facilities and safe water sources, both necessities in  
 
reducing food- and water-borne diseases. According to the FAO’s Food Security  
 
Indicators and as shown in “Table 3. Access to Improved Drinking Water,” the  
 
Table 3. Access to Improved Drinking Water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
percentage of Ghana’s population that has access to an “improved drinking water source”  
 
has grown in recent decades. Specifically, between 1993 and 2010, this percentage grew  
 
from only 59 percent to 86 percent (Food and Agriculture Organization 2013a). As  
 
explained by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Ghana is one 
 
of only five African countries that have already achieved the MDG target for water  
 
supply” (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank  
 
2010, 16). Democratization marked the turning point in addressing Ghana’s water safety  
 
concerns. In 1996, under Rawlings’ democratic administration, the Water Resources  
 
 Percentage of Population 
1990 53 
1995 62 
2000 71 
2005 79 
2010 86 
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Commission (WRC) was founded via Act 522 of Parliament. The WRC serves to  
 
“regulate and manage Ghana's Water Resources and co-ordinate government policies in  
 
relation to them…ownership and control of all water resources are vested in the President  
 
on behalf of the people…the WRC [is]…the overall body responsible for water resources  
 
management in Ghana” (Water Resources Commission of Ghana 2011a).  
 
 The establishment of the WRC spawned the creation and passing of other  
essential water safety initiatives such as the Public Utilities and Regulatory Commission  
(PURC) (Act No. 538), which was created in 1997 to monitor the quality of citizens’  
water supplies and protect citizens from being given water that is not safe for  
consumption. The PURC was originally focused on addressing these concerns in urban  
Ghana (Public Utilities Regulatory Commission 2012). One of the greatest failures of  
water safety in Ghana’s authoritarian years was the disregard for rural residents’ needs.  
Again, rural residents represent the vast majority of Ghana’s impoverished and food  
insecure population throughout its history. This neglect fed fuel to the proverbial fire. For  
instance, “until the early 1990s…only 2.2 million (28%) of the rural population had  
access to improved water whilst urban coverage was over 60%” (Community Water and  
Sanitation Agency 2013). In 1998, Ghana made strides to address this by creating the  
Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) (Act No. 564), dedicated to serving  
rural residents and their right to safe water. Shortly after the CWSA was introduced, this  
responsibility was in large part handed down to local District Assemblies as part of the  
GOG’s decentralization efforts to ensure that citizens can more easily express their needs  
to their local representatives and in turn see a quicker, more direct, and efficient response.  
In 2001, the GOG executed its first government-mandated water use regulations via the  
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Parliament’s approval of the Water Use Regulations Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 1692  
(2001). Regulations now stipulate that the WRC is responsible for distributing and  
monitoring proper water use permits and water rights. As of 2009, the WRC approved  
and monitored 154 registered water users. In 2010, the WRC increased this number to  
171, 63 percent of which provide “domestic and/or municipal water supply” (Water  
Resources Commission of Ghana 2011b).  Together, these initiatives have increased the  
percentage of Ghana’s population that has access to an improved drinking water source  
as discussed above.  
 As the GOG has expanded its focus on providing citizens with access to safe and  
 
consumable water, it has simultaneously taken equal strides to improve the nation’s 
 
sanitation system. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Ghana’s sewage systems were  
 
largely insufficient because of disintegrating pipe lines and pumping systems. Because  
 
the government’s attention was focused on the Economic Recovery Programme, sewage  
 
concerns were given minimal attention (Ghana Water Company Limited 2012). However,  
 
by the mid-1990s, the GOG recognized the importance of investing in proper sewage  
 
systems and the negative health effects that a poor sewage system had on citizens up until  
 
that point. However, as part of the CWSA’s decentralization process, in 1993, District  
 
Assemblies were also put in charge of transforming the rural sewage systems. One year  
 
later, Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was founded to monitor and  
 
safeguard the environment and, in this case, to ensure that sewage disposal is conducted  
 
appropriately and does not intermix with the nation’s consumable water sources  
 
(Environmental Protection Agency: Ghana 2013; Ghana Water Company Limited 2012).  
 
In 1999, the GOG created its first fully state-owned limited liability company, the Ghana  
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Water Company Limited, which is fully responsible for all urban water supply in Ghana  
 
(Ghana Water Company Limited 2012).  
 
 While these developments have directly aided in reducing food- and water-borne  
 
illness throughout the nation, they have also positively impacted food security efforts in  
 
unexpected and less direct ways. For example, improvements to sanitation have fostered  
 
an abundance of foodstuff businesses and kiosks in locations that used to be  
 
contaminated by human waste (The World Bank 2002). The FAO’s Food Security  
 
Indicators supports these findings of Ghana’s slow but effective improvements in the  
 
nation’s sanitation methods and systems. Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of  
 
Ghana’s population with access to sanitation facilities doubled from seven percent to 14  
 
percent, proving that, although gradual, the GOG’s efforts are making a visible impact  
 
(2013a).  
 
 
Political Participation and Government Accountability and Proficiency 
 In addition to creating a nonviolent, citizen-centric and social services based  
 
focus, the GOG has made progress in encouraging and supporting citizens’ political  
 
participation and working hand-in-hand with civil society organizations to make progress  
 
for the betterment of its citizenry and the state’s democracy. While historically, during  
 
authoritarian rule, the GOG viewed political participation and non-government initiated  
 
governance as a burden and hindrance to the government, it now recognizes that citizen  
 
involvement and civil society are crucial to maintaining free and fair political  
 
involvement of its citizenry and enabling citizens to contribute to the government’s  
 
decision-making process.  
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Voting Rights and Political Participation  
 
 In addition to committing itself to a fair, open, and nonviolent political system,  
 
since democratizing Ghana has focused on protecting all citizens’ rights to political  
 
participation and voting. According to Afrobarometer, in 2008, 78 percent of citizens 
surveyed said that they felt “completely free” to express their opinions. Similarly, when 
asked in 1999, 2003, and 2005 if the variable “freedom to say what you think” was better 
or worse than in previous years, the vast majority of citizens responded with “better/ 
much better” (Afrobarometer 2009, 11). In an effort to improve political inclusion and 
equal voting rights among the electorate, modifications to the 1992 Constitution were 
made in 2000, implementing a new delineation of “citizenship.” In years previous to 
democratization, Ghana struggled to decipher who and what embodies citizenship. Put 
simply, should non-native residents be permitted to acquire citizenship? Perhaps the 
greatest obstacle to providing non-native residents with the opportunity to acquire 
citizenship lay in the general public’s resistance and fear that expanding citizenship to 
non-native born residents would lessen the natives’ share of government aid and services 
(Kobo 2010). To native citizens, providing citizenship opportunities to “outsiders” was 
perceived as a zero-sum game. However, democratization fostered an environment in 
which expanding citizenship was no longer deemed as a threat to the masses. Democracy 
changed this alleged threat because it promised and proved to citizens that democracy’s 
commitment to equality, such as political participation and voting equality and the equal  
distribution of government attention and social services, would prevent new, non-native  
citizens from preferentialism and vice versa.  
 The degree to which native citizens and political leaders overcame this divide  
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within society is exemplified in the Citizenship Act, 2000, which was proposed and  
 
implemented in order to make citizenship a possibility for persons of all ages, classes,  
 
and origin who previously struggled to achieve citizenship (Parliament of the Republic of  
 
Ghana 2001). Of course, as with any law, the Citizenship Act came with some criticisms.  
 
Most notably, and the key concern expressed by the United Nations Committee on the  
 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the act allows male citizens’  
 
wives to acquire dual citizenship with little restrictions while female citizens’ husbands  
 
must be “permanently resident” in Ghana in order to become citizens. While this  
 
disparity is attributed to the state’s need to protect women from marrying men who enter  
 
into marriage for the sole purpose of obtaining citizenship, the CEDAW asserts that “it  
 
merely serves to reinforce, albeit erroneously, the image of women as being incapable of  
 
looking after themselves and always being in need of protection” (CEDAW 2005, 37).  
 
 Notwithstanding this discrepancy, the Citizenship Act, 2000, has as a whole been 
fundamentally successful in efforts to “…provide a [more] fair and non-discriminatory 
way of establishing citizenship rights. Moreover, since reforms were enacted in 2000, 
both men and women can pass on Ghanaian citizenship to their foreign spouses and to 
their children” (IDEG 2007a, 9). These are some, although far from all, of the ways that 
the democratic government of Ghana has expanded citizenship since 1992 in order to 
increase political participation and equal voting rights. Proving to be vital to the political 
system, non-native citizens provide democracy with not only a more diverse electorate, 
but as Ousman Kobo explains, they are also a political asset because they have created a 
larger “‘vote bank’ that must be harnessed to ensure victory during highly contested 
elections” (Kobo 2010, 68-69). This portion of the population has not only benefitted 
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from democracy, but in turn has had a reciprocal influence on democracy via its 
considerable presence in the electoral process in which it votes in accordance with the 
needs of the less privileged members of society.  
 With the exception of the unequal impact that the Citizenship Act has on female 
citizens’ spouses when compared to that of male citizens’ spouses, democracy has 
provided women with an outlet to become more politically active than they were 
previously allowed to before democratization. This is evident in three key developments: 
women’s right to vote, the formation and growing strength of women’s organizations, 
and the increasing amount of women holding political office. With this growing political 
activity, women have stressed and pressured the government of Ghana to increase the 
attention that it gives to women’s issues and to implementing laws and procedures that 
address the needs of Ghana’s women.  
 The women of Ghana have long been as being central to the health and wellbeing  
 
of Ghanaian families and households (Fallon 2003; CEDAW 2005). As noted by a survey  
 
participant of scholar Kathleen M. Fallon’s case study regarding democracy’s impact on  
 
women’s rights, in many Ghanaian homes, women are the head of the household. In  
 
addition to this, “…61% of urban and 53% of rural female-headed households fall in the  
 
poorest 20% of the population” (CEDAW 2005, 37). With this in mind, it is alarming that  
 
women were not allowed to vote and shape the way that government impacts the health  
 
and welfare of families until Ghana democratized. Undoubtedly, democracy and its  
 
prioritization of giving all people the right to vote has allowed women to emerge from  
 
their homes and the theoretical woodwork of society. This is a complete transformation  
 
from Ghana’s previous years of military rule in which voting and elections did not exist  
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(Fallon 2003). Moreover, women have come to use the right and power of their vote to  
 
change their health and economic status and that of their families. As one woman activist  
 
says: 
 
Elections are very important because for a long time we were under 
military rule. Elections give us the opportunity to select who we 
[women] want…. Even if we don’t work in the formal sector, we still 
work hard. Many women are the head of the household. So, if women 
know the right thing to do, it will help a lot…. We…want to educate 
women on their right to vote and the importance of voting...(Fallon 
2003, 535) 
  
 In addition to the right to vote, democracy has given the women of Ghana the  
 
opportunity to freely and fearlessly organize. As discussed in “Women’s Rights  
 
Organizations and Funding Regimes in Ghana,” authoritarian regimes and military rule  
 
left women with very few ways to politically organize; however, in the 1990s, post- 
 
democratization, women’s organizations flourished:  
 
In this period, there were a growing number of women‘s organizations 
involved in various areas of activism…Each worked separately, either 
delivering services or advocating policy changes on behalf of particular 
categories of women or women as a whole. As the 1990s wore on, 
these organizations consolidated and grew in number and strength. 
Some organizations shifted their activities from service delivery to 
policy advocacy or combined both activities because of a growing 
recognition of the importance of policy advocacy for delivering lasting 
change in women‘s lives…(Apusigah, Tsikata, and Mukhopadyay 
2011, 13) 
 
To date, prominent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to improve  
 
women’s involvement in the political sphere and their lives in Ghana more generally  
 
include but are not limited to the Women’s Initiative for Self-Empowerment (WISE), the  
 
Ghana Association of Women Entrepreneurs (GAWE), the Network for Women’s Rights  
 
in Ghana (NETRIGHT), and Abantu for Development, the Regional Office for Western  
 
Africa (ABANTU-ROWA).  
 
 The degree to which women have used their collective political rights and power  
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to change their health and wellbeing within Ghana is best embodied in the Women’s  
 
Manifesto of Ghana. Established by ABANTU-ROWA in 2004, the Women’s Manifesto  
 
was drafted because the women of ABANTU-ROWA recognized that gender inequality  
 
was largely at the root of other significant societal issues such as poverty and hunger  
 
(Global Fund for Women 2012). Within this manifesto, women demanded further  
 
advances to their equal rights, better and fairer treatment by the government, and better  
 
treatment within society. Largely in response to this Manifesto and the actions and  
 
demands of other women’s organizations, the number of female elected representatives in  
 
district assemblies drastically increased in 2006, along with female officials holding  
 
office as “Parliamentary Speaker, Police Inspector General and Attorney General”  
 
(Global Fund for Women 2012). Also as a result, Ghanaian government has  
 
accomplished the following: the establishment of the Domestic Violence Bill, growth and  
 
advancements within the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (DOVVSU) of  
 
the Police Service, and the creation of the Free Maternal Health Care program (Zaney  
 
2012). Ghanaian women’s organizations still utilize their manifesto as a political tool to  
 
remind the government of the remaining and emerging women’s issues that still need to  
 
be addressed.  
 
 Similarly, Ghana is now renowned for having a disability rights protection  
 
emphasis within the constitution that far exceeds its previous position (IDEG 2007a). As  
 
Franklin Oduro explains, “it is estimated that 10% of the Ghanaian population are  
 
disabled, the majority (55.5%) being women…Rectifying this deficit was  
 
imperative”(2009, 628). Most pertinent to voting rights and political participation, the  
 
2004 introduction of tactile ballot papers provided blind citizens with an accommodating  
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voting method, increasing blind voter turnout. Citizens with mental disabilities have also  
 
been given the legal right to vote within public psychiatric institutions (Ssengooba 2013).  
 
Most importantly, in 2006, the federal government passed the Persons with Disability Act  
 
(Act 715) which serves to eliminate ableism of political, civil, and social origin. Because  
 
of these efforts, the disabled have become more accepted and immersed within the  
 
political system (Oduro 2009).  
 
 As initially touched on above, the 2008 presidential election marked a time of  
 
transformation for Ghana’s political system. Not only was it an instance in which all  
 
citizens had the right to take part in free and fair elections, but most importantly, it was  
 
the first time in which citizens showed up in droves to vote, not only once, but three  
 
times. For this reason, it is the perfect example of how advancements in equal political  
 
rights have drastically improved Ghana’s political environment, the voting system, and  
 
democracy. Throughout this election, Ghanaians witnessed tallies that were too close to  
 
call a president elect. Because of this Ghanaians willingly returned to the polls again and  
 
again. This election shows how even in controversial, difficult elections, the citizens have  
 
remained committed to exercising their democratic right to participate in elections.  
 
 
 
Freedom of Speech and the Media 
 
 Just like its successful voting and elections system, Ghana’s media outlets are in  
 
the best state in the country’s history and among the best in Africa. As George Ayittey  
 
explains, the success of democracy in Ghana is largely attributed to the freedom of the  
 
press and the ability of citizens to utilize the press as a tool to portray their needs to  
 
government. Before democratization members of the media were heavily restricted in  
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what information and opinions they could share with the general public. Punishment for  
 
distributing a news release that the government disapproved of was often severe. The  
 
Rawlings administrations’ pre-democracy enforcement of the Criminal Libel Law of the  
 
Criminal Code 1960 Act left Ghana with a press that was unable to write or speak of the  
 
personal struggles and needs of the Ghanaian people out of fear of being legally  
 
punished (Boafo-Arthur 2007). Punishment could be anything from a fine of forty cedis  
 
to three years imprisonment (Anku-Tsede 2013, 26). However, the implementation of  
 
the nation’s new democratic constitution in 1992 and the abolition of the Criminal Libel  
 
Law in 2001 opened the doors for a more open, honest, and demanding press (IDEG  
 
2007a, 5). 
 
 Without doubt, democratization has fostered political participation and citizens’  
yearning to employ their political rights to better the standard of living; however, general  
citizens have not readily applied this to the more specific issue of food security. The  
following section entitled “The Inherent Influence of Civil Society” explores the many  
ways that civil society organizations (CSOs) have become politically involved and have  
made demands on government to address food insecurity and have themselves positively  
influenced food security; however, citizens at large have not jumped on this bandwagon  
to the same extent and media outlets have been slow in covering this issue. Arguably, this  
may be the case because, after democratizing, the government made many visible efforts  
to address food security and nutrition and, therefore, citizens did not feel inclined to make  
demands.   
 Because of this lack of participation, CSOs have started reaching out to citizens  
and have directly called upon the media to help them spread the word about the  
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importance of proper nutrition and food security for all. This undoubtedly is a work in  
progress. However, the greatest example of the strides that are being made in this regard  
is the very recent introduction of food security and nutrition workshops held specifically  
for members of the media as a way to educate them about food security and the need for  
their involvement in order to reach the nation’s goals. For instance, the latest workshop,  
given on September 5 of this year, focused on explaining and showing how members of  
the media could significantly, positively impact food security because publications, radio  
messages, and television broadcasts are perhaps the quickest and most inclusive forms of  
contact throughout Ghana. For this reason, when utilized, these media outlets can  
dramatically influence citizens’ knowledge about nutrition and food security and reiterate  
that citizen involvement is crucial in fighting food insecurity and understanding what  
citizens’ food security and nutrition needs are. The media then can be, and is slowly  
beginning to be, a helpful outlet in communicating this to citizens (Ghana News Agency  
2013).  
 
The Influence of Civil Society  
 Within Ghana, government support of emerging and strengthening civil society  
 
organizations (CSOs) has been slow to develop. Historically, the government and  
 
political authorities have perceived CSOs as being unnecessary and burdensome  
 
(Darkwa, Akosua, Nicholas Amponsah, and Evans Gyampoh 2006). However, since  
 
implementing the 1992 Constitution, government as a whole has worked to lessen this  
 
view of CSOs and to engage CSOs in the decision-making process: “These efforts have  
 
been further bolstered by proactive civil society engagement and systematic joint efforts  
 
on the part of government and development partners (DPs) on national policy issues”  
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(Akologo 2011, 56). Most importantly, CSOs are more involved, have a greater voice,  
 
and are stronger than ever before, leading to increased activism and advancements in  
 
“social justice, human rights…public accountability…poverty alleviation, good  
 
governance…[and] social accountability” (Apusiga 2009, 5). CSOs founded after  
 
democratization and which are devoted to bettering these democratic focuses include the  
 
following: the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) founded in 1993, Third World  
 
Network (TWN) established in 1994, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development  
 
(CDD) initiated in 1998, the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) created in  
 
2000, and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) instituted in 2003.  
 
 In addition to working with government, civil society has done its own part to  
 
make much needed changes within society. Because of this, Ghana continues to make  
 
strides in how accountable government is to its people. These strides are unparalleled in  
 
its history and largely within Africa, a primarily undemocratic continent. As highlighted  
 
in the literature review, democratic government allows civil society to not only exist but  
 
to also interact with it to make change. True democracies do not fear or feel threatened by  
 
civil society but instead purposely allow civil society to take its own actions. By  
 
interacting with and listening to civil society organizations and therefore the voices of the  
 
electorate, Ghana has created and expanded upon its levels of proficiency. Again,  
 
“proficiency” refers to the government’s commitment to implementing new and  
 
improving on existing government ministries, departments, and organizations committed  
 
to improving citizens’ wellbeing. Ghana’s growth and progress in this nature is discussed  
 
in greater depth below.  
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Proficiency and Development  
 
 Coupled with its successful CSOs and the government’s growing appreciation of  
 
these CSOs, Ghana has made prominent advancements in its government agencies,  
 
ministries, and departments to achieve this same goal. Concerning improving the general  
 
health of Ghana’s citizens, perhaps one of the most germane ministries has been the  
 
Ministry of Health (MOH). While the MOH was historically responsible for distributing  
 
health services to the populace, with the passing of ACT 525 in 1996—a requirement of  
 
the 1992 Constitution—this responsibility was handed down to the newly established  
 
Ghana Health Service (GHS) (Ghana Health Service 2012). In doing so, the government  
 
continued to expand upon efforts to distribute health services via the GHS but at the same  
 
time gave the MOH more opportunity to focus its time and energy on the policy aspects  
 
of health services. Now, the MOH is responsible for “policy formulation, monitoring and  
 
evaluation, resource mobilization and regulation of the health services delivery” and is  
 
committed to its primary goal as follows: “to improve the health status of all people  
 
living in Ghana through effective and efficient policy formulation, resource mobilization,  
 
monitoring and regulation of delivery of health care by different health agencies”  
 
(Ministry of Health 2012). While the MOH is not focused solely on food security, its  
 
influence on health policymaking and monitoring has served as a model of success and  
 
jumping off point for many ministries, agencies, and departments that are heavily  
 
concentrated on food security concerns. These ministries, agencies, and departments are  
 
discussed below following the discussion on civil society’s impact on food security.  
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Political Participation, Government Accountability and Proficiency, and Food  
Security  
 
 While the previous sections shed light on the ways democracy has produced a  
 
more participatory electorate and civil society, the following section delves further into  
 
how civil society groups and government ministries and departments focus specifically  
 
on food security concerns and how they work together to bring Ghana’s food security  
 
goals to fruition.  
 
 
 
The Powerful Presence of Food Security-Based Civil Society Groups. In addition to  
 
many health related civil society groups in Ghana, the GOG’s emphasis on food security  
 
has sparked the formation of many food security and nutrition civil society groups.  
 
Perhaps the most renowned is the Ghana Alliance against Hunger and Malnutrition  
 
(HAG), which was founded in 2005. It is currently made up of over 60 supporting CSOs  
 
and, arguably, its most successful objective to date has been its dedication to fusing  
 
Ghana’s legislature and food security policies with civil society and its food security  
 
goals: “HAG seeks to address hunger and malnutrition in Ghana through effective  
 
networking, advocacy, campaign, monitoring, research, partnership and peer-to-peer  
 
capacity building” (United Nations Development Programme N.d.). Examples of its  
 
success can be seen in the organization’s physical feats and the alliances it forged with  
 
the GOG and other CSOs around the world. Currently, it is an alliance of the FAO’s  
 
Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (AAHM) (Alliance Against Hunger and  
 
Malnutrition n.d.). 
 
 To date, HAG deserves credit for co-founding many community development  
 
programs, including the Ghana School Feeding Programme and the Village Food  
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Banking Concept Development in Rural Ghana. The Ghana School Feeding Programme  
 
was established in 2005 as a collective effort made by HAG, other affiliate CSOs, and the  
 
GOG as a supplemental program rooted in suggestions made by the African Union-New  
 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (AU-NEPAD). AU-NEPAD is a continentally- 
 
based governance structure composed of African leaders who prioritize the importance of  
 
having a  
 
strategic framework for pan-African socio-economic development… 
[as] both a vision and a policy framework for Africa in the twenty-first 
century. Within this broad goal, one of the AU-NEPAD’s main 
concerns is food security and poverty within all African states. One key 
emphasis of this nature is to encourage African states to adopt societal 
practices that utilize local and ‘home-grown’ products. (NEPAD 2013)  
 
 As a result of AU-NEPAD, Ghana became one of nine African countries to  
 
institute a preliminary, trial school feeding program. In turn, Ghana’s School Feeding  
 
Programme was created, grounded in the GPRS II (Afoakwa n.d). At its core, the  
 
program serves to improve children’s daily caloric and nutritional intake by providing  
 
students of Ghana’s most food-insecure regions with government-funded, daily hot  
 
lunches at their respective schools. In some cases, the program’s meals are the only  
 
nutritious and substantial meal that these students receive in a given day. As a result of  
 
this program, there is not only an increase in these students’ consumption but an equally  
 
important improvement and increase in school attendance (Commission on Human  
 
Rights and Administrative Justice 2010). For example, in a study conducted by the World  
 
Food Programme, results show that  
 
The objective of using the school feeding programme in the three 
schools to increase enrolment and improve retention and attendance is 
being achieved. Also, the three schools have not experienced any 
school drop-outs in the last two years. Furthermore, punctuality in the 
schools was said to have been improved…from discussions with the 
communities, it was confirmed that all children of school age in the 
three communities are in school. (2007, 18) 
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This is a great leap forward for those schools that on average have high drop-out and  
 
truancy rates. Additionally, utilizing local farmers’ products has also improved the  
 
wellbeing and income of the nation’s farmers. The GOG requires that within this program  
 
products be purchased from the corresponding local farmers within the schools’ districts  
 
(Afoakwa n.d.). This ensures that not only do students get fresh and nutritious local  
 
ingredients but also that local farmers receive a steady stream of income as a result of  
 
being a part of the program. Not only did HAG play a fundamental role in advocating for  
 
the creation of this program but it has also played a direct role in how the program is run.  
 
Up until 2009, the executive director of HAG also served as the head of the Ghana  
 
School Feeding Programme, working hand-in-hand with the GOG to ensure the  
 
successful implementation of the program (United Nations Development Programme  
 
n.d.) 
  
 Similarly, HAG worked with the Global Food Banking Network (GFN) to  
 
produce the Village Food Banking Concept Development in Rural Ghana. In order to  
 
help farmers advance their skills, practices and incomes, this program has taken one step  
 
past the GOG’s programs as discussed above (GAIP, RTIP and RTIMP, workshops, etc.) 
 
and has given Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs) access to new technologies such as  
 
cell phones and the internet and awards grants to assist in paying the financial burdens of  
 
farming. In return, these recipients are asked to give their excess yields to their local  
 
community food banks (The Global Food Banking Network 2007/2008). HAG has  
 
largely taken the nation’s Eastern region under its wing in regards to the general  
 
operating procedure of this program (United Nations Development Programme n.d.). 
 
 In addition to the food security programs that HAG has helped spearhead in  
 
116 
 
Ghana, it is also one of the nation’s most interactive CSOs because it assembles many of  
 
Ghana’s other food security, nutrition, and health CSOs in order to advocate society’s  
 
needs and opinions to the GOG. One of its greatest achievements is the Ghana  
 
Parliamentarians Caucus Against Hunger and Malnutrition, a bipartisan caucus within the  
 
nation’s parliament. The primary purpose of the caucus is to make all legislators aware of  
 
emerging and existing food security concerns and to utilize the caucus as a way for CSOs  
 
and parliament to jointly address these concern. The participation of parliamentarians  
 
shows that Ghana’s CSOs have the ability to influence policy-making in Ghana and have  
 
already achieved a mutual understanding with the GOG that food security and nutrition  
 
are at the forefront of the country’s development goals (Alliance Against Hunger and  
 
Malnutrition n.d.).  
 
 The caucus and HAG have also worked collaboratively to join Scaling up  
 
Nutrition, an international organization that strengthens the relationship between CSOs  
 
and national governments for the purpose of securing a country-led approach to “scaling  
 
up” the importance of nutrition in society (Scaling up Nutrition 2013). As a direct  
 
outcome of joining the Scaling up Nutrition community, Ghana, i.e. a group of the   
 
nation’s CSOs with the support of the GOG, founded the Ghana Coalition Of Civil  
 
Society Organisations for Scaling up Nutrition (GHACCSSUN) in 2013 (Ghana  
 
Coalition of Civil Society for Scaling Up Nutrition 2013). Although in its infancy,  
 
GHACCSSUN has already provided Ghana’s CSOs with an advantage that the nation  
 
was lacking for decades: a coalition in which CSOs brainstorm ways that adequate  
 
nutrition and the right to food can be expanded upon and procured for all citizens.  
 
 Already, the coalition and its CSO members have been given support by two  
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separate but equally valuable allies: the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)  
 
and the Ghana Parliamentarians Against Hunger and Malnutrition Caucus, one of its co- 
 
founders. To help give GHACCSSUN a preliminary leg to stand on, the WFP has  
 
donated $374,500 (USD). The WFP’s funding is set to cover the years 2012 to 2015  
 
(United Nations Development Programme 2013b). At the operational level, the caucus  
 
has pledged to expand its role as a co-founder by being a sounding board and listening  
 
ear for the issues that arise within GHACCSSUN and to be responsive and accountable to  
 
GHACCSSUN during the policy-making process. In his speech presented at the  
 
inauguration of the GHACCSSUN, Honorable Kwabena Appiah Pinkrah, the Co- 
 
chairman of the Ghana Parliamentarians against Hunger and Malnutrition Caucus,  
 
declared that he and the caucus’ other participating parliamentarians are eager to utilize  
 
GHACCSSUN to facilitate greater communication and coordination between the nation’s  
 
CSOs and the nation’s parliamentarians to introduce new food security and nutrition  
 
policies (Ghana Business News 2013b). He also explained that  
  
the Caucus would lobby for increased budget allocation for nutrition 
programmes in general, while serving as the ally of civil society 
platforms for the intensification of  national advocacy to raise the 
visibility of nutrition in Ghana and work towards the  attainment of a 
well-nourished and productive Ghanaian society. To achieve these 
targets and commitments, he said, the Caucus would contribute to the 
process for the integration of nutrition and agriculture at the policy 
level by supporting dialogue and consultation processes on the linkages 
between nutrition and agriculture at the highest level of governance. 
(Government of Ghana 2013) 
 
Lastly, Honorable Kwabena Appiah Pinkrah confirmed that, in joining the Scaling up  
 
Nutrition Movement, the nation now has a new “nutrition policy” and approach to  
 
tackling remaining nutrition struggles (Ghana Business News 2013b; Government of  
 
Ghana 2013).  
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Merging Accountability with Proficiency: Innovative Strategies, Research and  
 
Development. Not only is there evidence to support that CSOs have the power and know- 
 
how to democratically influence food security and nutrition policy within democratic  
 
Ghana in ways that were previously absent, but also, CSOs have helped the government  
 
improve proficiency by participating in the implementation of many GOG food security  
 
strategies and plans such as the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy  
 
(FASDEP) of 2002 and the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy II  
 
(FASDEP II) of 2007. Together, these are two of the nation’s most successful agricultural  
 
strategies for addressing food security thus far. FASDEP was created to improve the  
 
services, skills, and technologies within Ghana’s agriculture sector to modernize the  
 
sector as a whole and therefore improve the nation’s economy and standing in the  
 
international community. Since the implementation of the original FASDEP, FASDEP II  
 
was crafted to restructure FASDEP to achieve unaccomplished goals (Ministry of Food  
 
and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana 2013c; The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture  
 
Development Programme n.d.). FASDEP II exists to more thoroughly serve the people of  
 
Ghana in a direct manner by achieving “‘…modernised agriculture culminating in a  
 
structurally transformed economy…evident in food security, employment opportunities  
 
and reduced poverty’” by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana  
 
2007). To accomplish previously unsuccessful goals, which largely failed because of  
 
“underfunding [and] standalone and uncoordinated projects”, MOFA strongly encourages  
 
assistance and input from non-state actors (Sharma 2011). Agents of the private sector,  
 
NGOs, and CSOs provide insight into what the food and agriculture sector is like at the  
 
ground level and what changes are necessary in bringing the goals of FASDEP II to  
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fruition (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana 2007).  
 
 The initiatives addressed in the above section of “Government Accountability and  
 
Proficiency and Food Security” show many of the programs that the GOG has created in  
 
line with FASDEP II and in the name of improving the distribution of food security  
 
social services to all citizens; however, other initiatives have been introduced under  
 
FASDEP II in order to advance the food and agriculture sector specifically. Six  
 
“programmes” are outlined within the FASDEP II strategy, two of these being as follows:  
 
food security and emergency preparedness and science and technology applied in food  
 
and agriculture development. While the food security and emergency preparedness  
 
program addresses many focuses that were discussed extensively above (i.e., crop  
 
production and distribution, water management, support for improved nutrition, etc.), the  
 
science and technology program surpasses this and concentrates on advancing food and  
 
agriculture research and technology in order to advance the quality of the aforementioned  
 
social services (The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 2009).  
 
While FASDEP II is still a policy in progress, the MOFA has already executed and  
 
fulfilled some of these research and technology plans of action.  
 
 While Ghana was plagued with insufficient agricultural research and development  
 
(R&D) in the 1990s and early 2000, FASDEP II ushered in an agricultural R&D  
 
evolution that was historically unparalleled and is still largely unmatched by other  
 
African states today. First, since initiating FASDEP II, the GOG has drastically increased  
 
its budgetary allotment for agricultural R&D. According to the Agricultural Science and  
 
Technology Indicators (ASTI) facilitated by IFPRI, in 2008, “Ghana spent 352 billion  
 
cedis or 95 million PPP dollars on agricultural R&D (both in 2005 constant prices)  
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compared with 151 billion cedis or 41 million dollars in 2002” (Flaherty, Owusu, and  
 
Asare 2010, 1). Via FASDEP, FASDEP II, government-sponsored agricultural  
 
R&D agencies such as the Crops Research Institute, and higher education agencies such  
 
as the University of Ghana’s Institute of Agricultural Research, and the public sector,  
 
Ghana has witnessed a much-needed escalation in funds allotted to agricultural R&D.  
 
The IFPRI’s Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators show the agricultural R&D  
 
funding patterns of the government sector, higher education sector, and public sector.  
 
Most notably, between 2002 and 2008 alone, funding from the three collective sectors  
 
soared to levels higher than ever before. This incremental growth occurred more rapidly  
 
than the collective growth preceding this time span (2013). Between 2001 and 2008,  
 
Ghana had the second highest increase in agricultural R&D spending in Africa with a $56  
 
million USD increase (Beintema and Stads 2011). Out of this budget growth, the number  
 
of agricultural researchers and scientists and the quality of resources available to these  
 
researchers and scientists have risen. According to ASTI, although the growth in  
 
agricultural researchers and scientists did not occur as quickly as that of the budget  
 
allotments, there has been a steady increase since 2000 (Flaherty, Owusu, and Asare  
 
2010). Furthermore, researchers now have more resources than ever before. An ASTI  
 
study conducted by Nienke Beintema and Gert-Jan Stads found that Ghana is one of only  
 
two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with higher “resources per scientist” in 2000 than in  
 
1981 (Beintema and Stads 2006).  
  
 Out of R&D modifications, scientists can more thoroughly address some of the  
 
nation’s agricultural shortcomings. For instance, a study led by Teunis van Rheenen et al.  
 
reviews many agricultural R&D advancements since Ghana’s democratization. In  
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surveying scientists of agricultural research organizations, it was found that 70 percent of  
 
respondents developed new agricultural technologies in response to requests made by the  
 
MOFA and farmers. Additionally, 28 percent developed new technologies in response to  
 
an increase in funding and resources (van Rheenen et al. 2012).  
 
 These technologies include, but are not limited to, the following issue areas: an 
integrated approach to pest management of groundnut, snail farming, and the improved 
cassava variety Afisiafi. First, improvement to groundnut yields is crucial because 90 
percent of households in northern Ghana, the nation’s most food insecure and poverty 
stricken region, cultivate groundnut. However, because of overwhelming devastation 
brought on by diseases and pest, this product, which was once very profitable and 
popular, was largely abandoned by farmers in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, 13 
scientists ushered in three phases of research and trials, starting in 1997 and spanning 
until 2012, to find a solution. Today, groundnut cultivating has increased again in direct 
response to these scientists’ development of an effective and environmentally friendly 
pest control that regulates soil invertebrates (van Rheenen et al. 2012).  
 In addition to advancing technologies for pest control and therefore increasing 
production, scientists have also devised tools to begin producing foods that were 
historically imported, an example being snails. Snails are high in protein, iron, and amino 
acids, which has made them very popular among Ghanaians for decades (Cobbinah, 
Vink, and Onwuka 2008). However, until the late 1980s and early 1990s, snails were 
heavily imported from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. While the idea to introduce Ghanaians 
to snail farming emerged in the late 1980s, the realization and greatest strides in this 
regard occurred very recently because of the plethora of advanced research, workshops, 
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and publications. Farmers have been taught about the affordability of snail farming and 
about the nationwide high snail consumption rates. Today, the annual consumption rates 
of snails are roughly 15,000 tonnes, the equivalent to roughly 15,000 metric tons (van 
Rheenen et al. 2012). With local availability, this rate is likely to increase and, in turn, 
local farmers can reap the benefits of domestic sales.    
 Lastly, scientists have made many strides to strengthen the quantity and quality of 
Ghana’s staple foods, as seen in the improved cassava variety Afisiafi. As of 2005, 
roughly 80 percent of Ghanaians have relied on cassava as the primary starch in their 
daily diet. Furthermore, as van Rheenen et al. explain, “cassava remains an important 
source of Ghana’s food security since it is cheap, easy to transport, and can withstand 
storage for long periods…” (2012). However, similar to groundnut, pests and diseases 
can hinder production levels and the quality of yields. To address this, scientists 
generated the Afisiafi cassava in 1993 and made improvements on this variety in 2005 
and again in 2010. The benefits of this variety are numerous: “It yields two and a half 
times the traditional varieties and is also disease and pest-resistant. It is also more 
suitable for making gari, a granular flour of varying texture made from cassava tuber, and 
agbelima, a fermented cassava meal…” (van Rheenen et al. 2012). Ultimately, van 
Rheenen et al.’s survey shows that since democratizing, especially since the early 2000s,  
scientists have used the agricultural R&D budgetary increase to transform the agricultural  
sector and to fulfill farmers’ demands and the food security needs of the nation at large.  
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Data Indicators of Significant Food Security Improvements 
 As was compiled and presented for Ghana’s pre-democracy years in chapter four  
 
(see page 67), the following section refers back to data pertaining to the Domestic Food  
 
Price Level Index, GHI, malnutrition and underweight percentages, and DES to provide  
 
statistical support of qualitative findings. Collectively, these findings give statistical  
 
support of the above-discussed finding that, over time, democracy has had a powerful,  
 
positive impact on food security levels in Ghana.  
 
 Beginning with the FAO’s Domestic Food Price Level Index, Ghana’s Food Price  
 
Level Index in 1996, only four years after democratizing, was 2.92, compared to 3.05  
 
in 1992. Over the next decade the index fell rather steadily and rapidly. By 2012, the  
 
index dropped to 1.77, which marked the lowest point within at least a 21-year time  
 
frame (Food and Agriculture Organization 2013a). To show the nation’s progress, “Table  
 
4. Domestic Food Price Level” below presents Ghana’s FAO food price levels, showing  
 
the decline in food price level of every fourth year from 1992 to 2012 (Food and  
 
Agriculture Organization 2013a). 
 
Table 4. Domestic Food Price Level 
 Price Level 
1992 3.05 
1996 2.92 
2000 2.43 
2004 2.34 
2008 2.13 
2012 1.77 
 
 Data from the IFPRI’s Global Hunger Index (GHI) shows that just as Ghana’s  
 
Domestic Food Price Level Index has decreased in post-democratization decades, so has  
 
the nation’s GHI score. To review, the GHI score is an accumulation of the state’s  
 
“percent of undernourished,” the “prevalence of underweight in children younger than  
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five years,” and the “under-five mortality rate (%)” over a five-year period (For further  
 
review about how the GHI is calculated, refer back to page 39 above). Since  
 
democratizing, GHI scores have been tallied for the years of 1996 (with data from 1994- 
 
1998), 2001 (with data from 1999-2003), and 2012 (with data from 2005-2010). Very  
 
differently from the 21.4 GHI score (which the IFPRI considered to be “alarming”) in  
 
1990, by 2012, the score fell to a staggering 8.9, a “moderate” hunger score, and the  
 
lowest score in at least 22 years. Similar to the Domestic Food Price Level Index, the  
 
GHI index scores from 1990 to 2012 were each significantly lower than preceding scores.  
 
“Table 5. Global Hunger Index Scores” depicts this trend with scores taken from the  
 
IFPRI’s 2012 Global Hunger Index (International Food Policy Research Institute 2012).   
 
 Deconstructing Ghana’s GHI scores shows that the three components that  
 
determine a GHI score have all exhibited significant improvement over time;  
 
furthermore, the “percent of undernourished” and the “under-five mortality rate (%)”  
 
have all progressively decreased from year to year without regressing. The only lapse  
 
      Table 5. Global Hunger Index Scores 
 Score Hunger Classification 
1990 21.4 Alarming 
1996 16.3 Serious 
2001 12.8 Serious 
2012 8.9 Moderate 
 
among the “prevalence of underweight in children younger than five years” occurred  
 
between 1994 and 1998 during which time the score jumped from 24 to 25.1 during the  
 
years of 1988 and 1992. Collectively, this data demonstrates that hunger levels have  
 
significantly decreased as a result of and in accordance with drastic improvements to  
 
these other serious factors (IFPRI 2012).  
  
 Data of the percentage of malnutrition prevalence over time shows that in  
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1988 a little over 30 percent of Ghanaians were underweight. However, by 2008 it  
 
plunged to 17.3 percent, dropping a total of 12.7 percent since 1988 (Wiggins and  
 
Leturque 2011). Below, “Table 6. Percentage of Population Underweight” shows the  
 
decreasing proportion of the population that are underweight.  
 
        Table 6. Percentage of Population Underweight  
Year Percent Population Underweight 
1988 30.3 
1998 24.9 
2003 21.8 
2008 17.3 
  
Correspondingly, as mentioned above, the magnitude of the population that was 
undernourished was 34 percent in 1991. In 2005 undernourishment was only prevalent in 
eight percent of Ghana’s population. This constitutes a change of 26 percent since 1991, 
leaving only a minority of the population subject to undernourishment (Wiggins and 
Leturque 2011). “Table 7. Prevalence of Undernourishment” conveys the descending 
rates of undernourishment since democratization.  
           Table 7. Prevalence of Undernourishment 
 Percent Population Undernourished 
1991 34 
1996 16 
2001 12 
2005 8 
  
 Analyzing where Ghana falls regarding the per capita Dietary Energy Supply  
 
(DES) requirement, which stipulates that the per capita daily caloric intake should not fall  
 
short of 2,118 calories, shows that Ghana has achieved higher DES levels than it did in  
 
authoritarian decades. From 1987 to 1989, Ghana’s citizens averaged a daily caloric  
 
intake of only 2,000 calories. This was 118 calories short of the DES requirement.  
 
However, between 2001 and 2003, this figure rose to approximately 2,600 calories. As  
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shown in table eight below, this is an improvement of 600 calories and has left Ghana  
 
482 calories above the DES requirement (Agble 2009).  
 
         Table 8. Daily Energy Supply  
 Per Capita Daily 
Caloric Intake 
DES Requirement 
1987-1989 2,000 Deficient 118 cal. 
1994-1996 2,400 Surpassed by 282 cal. 
2001-2003 2,600 Surpassed by 482 cal. 
 
 
Continuing Food Security Commitments and International Recognition   
 
 In addition to the above-mentioned strides, Ghana has pledged its allegiance and  
membership to the G8 Summit “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.” Born out  
of the 2012 Camp David Summit of the G8, the alliance aims to “lift 50 million people  
out of poverty over the next 10 years by using a collective approach of pro-poor policies  
committed to by African governments, substantial private sector investment in order to  
increase agriculture productivity and farmer incomes, and donor governments aligning  
behind country-led plans” (ONE n.d.). Ghana is one of only six African countries to join  
the alliance (ONE n.d.; The White House: Office of the Press Secretary 2013). As a  
member, the GOG promises to focus its budget, resources, and overall attention on  
improving the following: agriculture regulations, fertilizer and seed distribution and use,  
and increasing investment(s) in agriculture by reducing the costs and risks of doing so. In  
being an active member of the alliance and through all of the government’s  
accomplishments discussed above, the GOG proves to the international community and  
its citizens that fighting hunger does not come with a quick fix but rather that it takes  
years of trial and error, struggle, and devotion to make a noticeable change to such a  
nationally debilitating issue.  
 For Ghana, years of democratic developments and policies have come to fruition  
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as the GOG has been internationally recognized for its progress, most notably by the  
FAO. On June 16, 2013, Ghana was one of only two countries in Africa and eighteen in  
the world to receive one of the FAO’s most highly esteemed awards, the Award for  
Notable and Outstanding Progress in Fighting Hunger. Hailed for reducing hunger levels  
from 40.5 percent between 1990 and 1992 to less than five percent between 2010 and  
2012, Ghana is being lauded for achieving the first Millennium Development Goal two  
years before its 2015 target (Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Republic of Ghana 2013;  
Food and Agriculture Organization 2013b). Because of this success and the nation’s  
publically proclaimed promise to further food security in the name of democracy and via  
the democratic mechanisms discussed above, democratization provided the conditions in  
which a grassroots food security movement grew and state-level pro-food security  
policies proliferated. In this case study, this was the powerful tool that transformed the  
nation’s food security status in only 20 years time.  
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Summary of the Research Problem, Methods, and Findings 
 In the late twentieth century, Amartya Sen argued that famine did not and could  
not exist in any country that is a democracy with a relatively free press. His findings were  
considered groundbreaking within the discipline of political science and among  
democracy scholarship specifically. However, now in the twenty-first century, little  
research has been conducted to test the applicability of Sen’s findings to today’s society.  
Specifically, the following question is still unanswered in existing literature: Do  
democratic mechanisms have an impact on combatting lesser forms of hunger, and if so,  
how? This study served to address this research problem and to expand the limitations of  
existing literature. Finding it overzealous to attest that democracy always improves food  
security within any given state, especially considering the high levels of hunger within  
democratic India, this study set out to demonstrate that democracy has positively  
impacted food security in the specific case of Ghana.  
 Ghana was chosen for this case study for many reasons. First, the nation’s  
food security improvements over the last two decades are a remarkable exception in an  
otherwise predominantly hunger-ridden continent. When coupled with the 1992  
democratization and democratic growth that progressed simultaneously with these food  
security improvements, questions emerge as to if these improvements occurred  
simultaneously for a reason or if they occurred coincidentally. Is democracy the  
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independent variable in this instance? Furthermore, because Ghana has made some of the  
greatest strides in recent decades regarding food security and democracy within Africa,  
studying Ghana served to potentially showcase to other African countries how democracy  
has bettered Ghana’s food security. While there is no proof that democratizing or  
advancing an existing democracy will advance other nations’ food security levels, it may  
facilitate thought and discussion within other African countries about the benefits of  
democracy.   
 To test this hypothesis, this researcher chose a small-N research design, a  
longitudinal case study, instead of a large-N study because her purpose was to analyze  
why, and especially how, the main mechanisms of democracy—political stability and  
government effectiveness, and political participation and government accountability and 
proficiency—have directly, positively impacted Ghana’s food security levels over time. 
Conducting a large-N study would have been valuable if this study intended to conduct a 
cross-national study to see what countries have seen improved food security levels as a 
result of democracy. However, conducting quantitative, large-scale research often leads 
to findings that are indicative of an outsider’s perspective and is not as engaging. Also, 
these studies can often lack empirical details and richness. They cannot easily explain or 
illustrate the link between the independent variable and dependent variable. A case study 
approach is more suitable to show the microprocesses that link variables. For these 
reasons, this study facilitated qualitative research, “a predominantly inductive, and 
discovery-oriented, approach …embodying a view of social reality as a constantly 
changing property of individuals’ perceptions…and aiming to get an ‘insider’s’ 
perspective…of the phenomena under study” (Heath and Tynan 2010). The study 
analyzed the following primary sources: surveys, Freedom House scores, news releases, 
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GOG documents, policies and legislation, CSO programs, the Domestic Food Price Level 
Index, GHI, malnutrition and underweight percentages, and DES. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 This study concludes that democratic processes have fostered an environment that  
has increased food security levels within Ghana. Notably, the greatest food security  
strides have emerged under the government effectiveness and government accountability  
and proficiency umbrellas. While media outlets are slowly being educated about food  
security and are in turn beginning to use their powers of mass communication to educate  
citizens about the importance of their political involvement in reducing hunger, the  
citizenry has been slow to make individual food and nutrition-based demands of  
government. However, citizens have collectively, via CSOs, made many food security  
demands and efforts to not only hold government accountable, but also to increase food  
security through the CSOs themselves. Together, the GOG and CSOs have made ample  
efforts and have achieved equally as many successes in this regard, as exemplified by the  
Ghana Parliamentarians Caucus Against Hunger and Malnutrition and GHACCSSUN.  
On its own, the GOG has distributed numerous food security related social services.  
Regarding agriculture and food production, the GOG has initiated crop insurance  
programs such as GAIP, farmer education programs including the Breadbasket Initiative  
and “The Role of Agriculture in Achieving Middle-Income Status” workshop, crop  
advancement programs such as RTIP and RTIMP, irrigation development via the IDA,  
and infrastructure advancements including roadway development, safe water supply, and  
improved sewage disposal. Lastly, Ghana has advanced its agricultural research and  
development (R&D) through escalated research funds and advancements within the  
agriculture and food sector, as exemplified by groundnut pest management   
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developments, the introduction and growth of snail farming, and the improved cassava  
variety Afisiafi.  
 The implications that arise from these findings are that, through democracy,  
 
Ghana has ushered in a new era of food security and made significant strides in the last  
 
two decades to become one of the most food secure nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. It  
 
serves as a model success story of how the mechanisms of democracy, when  
 
successfully implemented, can draw national attention and efforts to the importance of  
 
prioritizing citizens’ needs, respecting human rights, and in turn focusing on the right to  
 
food. Citizens have been given the opportunity to demand improved food security levels,  
 
government is held accountable to the people and must focus on their needs, and  
 
government and CSOs have joined together to facilitate top-down and grassroots efforts  
 
in solving the issue of hunger.  
 
 Potential for future studies emerge out of these findings. While this study has  
 
focused on showing how the mechanisms of democracy have been conducive to  
 
furthering food security levels in Ghana specifically, the illustrated democratic variables  
 
can be tested in other cases and may contribute to theory building within the discipline.  
 
Doing so would add to the significance of this study and potentially improve Sen’s  
 
findings, and draw attention to the larger implications of democracy’s potential influence  
 
on food security throughout the world. This study then serves as a starting point for  
 
further democracy and food security theory building.   
 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Out of this study’s findings come suggestions for future research. Primarily,  
within this study, the greatest limitation and hindrance was the geographical distance  
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between the author and Ghana. Because of this, the sources utilized were surveys, data,  
and policies that were already conducted and presented via other scholars and  
organizations. Conducting action research would have benefitted this study in that the  
author could have physically communicated with citizens, governing officials, and CSO  
representatives to better understand how and why food security improved because of  
democracy. Therefore, although this case study provides a greater “insider” perspective  
than a large-N research design would, it is suggested that in further researching Ghana’s  
food security levels that the researcher incorporate action research.  
 Also, in conducting future research, scholars should examine the nation’s  
lingering food security issues. Through this case study, it became evident that while food  
security has increased drastically throughout Ghana as a whole since democratizing, food  
insecurity and hunger are still hitting some heavily disadvantaged groups within society.  
Mainly, women and residents of northern Ghana are the most food insecure. It would be  
advantageous then to research why this is the case and how food security developments  
can be more evenly distributed in the years to come.    
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